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"How far the law will allow a man to enjoy rights in property which he
cannot transfer, and which his creditors cannot take for their debts, is a
question becoming more and more frequent in this country."
-John Chipman Gray, 1883.
I.

INTRODUCTION

To Gray and other commentators of the day, in the late 1800s the
matter of trust asset protection was cutting-edge and charged with issues
ranging from personal responsibility to discrepancies across socioeconomic strata. The policy debate was grounded in the proposition that
an individual of means might bestow upon another the right to enjoy
property in a form that was immune from attachment by that person's
creditors. Specifically, the idea was that an individual (the settlor) could
place assets in a trust, designate a person (the beneficiary) as being
entitled to enjoy the benefits of the trust assets, and preclude that
beneficiary's creditors from forcing a transfer of the trust interest or
assets in satisfaction of their claims. Both then and now, such protection
1. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY iii (1st ed. 1883).
The second edition of this work was published in 1895 and includes the quoted language in a reprint

of the original preface. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY iii

(2d ed. 1895) [hereinafter GRAY, RESTRAINTS].
2. These concepts of trust settlor, beneficiary, and the possible exclusion of creditors from
such enjoyment are discussed more fully beginning in Part 11,infra.
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is most simply obtained through state law recognition of trust provisions
that prohibit any such transfer. These provisions are commonly referred
to
to as spendthrift, or anti-alienation, provisions. A trust that is subject
4
this type of provision is typically denominated a spendthrift trust.
While the policy debate concerning such arrangements is both
historic and rich, a more pragmatic point of view reveals three important
observations. These observations, in turn, suggest a less obvious but
more focused inquiry into this matter of protected private endowment.
First, at its core, the question recognized by Gray in 1883 concerns the
contrived enjoyment of assets (or interests therein) that are structurally
shielded from creditor claims. That question is, therefore, essentially one
of asset protection. Second, the particularly troublesome spendthrift trust
variant of asset protection had by the close of the nineteenth century
become an established fixture in the United States legal framework,
notwithstanding the early policy debate,. Finally, despite its articulation
over 120 years ago, the asset protection question quoted from Gray at
the outset of this Article is today both unresolved and undeniably
apropos. For example, longstanding notions regarding the scope of
protections and parties that might be currently affected by what began
simply as the state-sanctioned spendthrift trust are today challenged by
the emergence of offshore and domestic asset protection trust devices,

3. The anti-alienation characterization reflects the fact that such provisions present a classic
restraint on the ability to alienate an interest in property, which restraints are in most instances void.
See generally Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth
Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1985) (discussing restraints on alienation); Richard E. Manning,
The Development of Restraintson Alienation Since Gray, 48 HARV. L. REV. 373 (1935) (providing
an examination of post-1900 developments in restraints on alienation jurisprudence).
4. A "spendthrift trust" is defined basically as a trust that is subject to a provision that states
simply, for example, that the interest of the beneficiary is inalienable and that creditors cannot reach
the interest in satisfaction of their claims. See I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 152, cmt. bc (1959). This type of provision might be included in the trust instrument as an expression of the
trust settlor's intent that the beneficiary's interest be so restricted and thus protected, or the
provision might apply, for example, by operation of some statute that deems the particular type of
trust at issue to be subject to such a restriction. To be truly effective, the provision must operate to
preclude both voluntary alienation at the behest of the beneficiary, as well as involuntary alienation
at the behest of the beneficiary's creditors.
5. With regard to the definition of a "spendthrift trust," see id. With regard to the early
acceptability of spendthrift trusts, see, for example, Lawrence M. Friedman, The Dynastic Trust, 73
YALE L.J. 547, 582 (1964) ("The decisive cases validating the [spendthrift] clause fall into a
relatively narrow time-span, beginning about 1880, following in rapid succession for about 25
years, then tapering off, since most jurisdictions had by then settled the major issue."). See also
Karen E. Boxx, Gray's Ghost-A Conversation About the Onshore Trust, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1195,
1197 (2000) ("As spendthrift trusts gained recognition at the turn of the nineteenth century, their
primary foe, John Chipman Gray, acknowledged defeat without surrendering his objections.")
(footnotes omitted).
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fluidity in the codification and posturing of traditional spendthrift trust
protections, and an increasing emphasis on asset protection for a vast
array of trust-like retirement arrangements. These observations suggest
that the operative legal landscape, historically prompting such fervent
debate about the enjoyment of property and the obligation to pay one's
debts, is today in the midst of a significant evolution that warrants
further inquiry.
Despite over a century's worth of debate and the contemporary
importance of such issues, however, something is missing from the
analysis. Specifically, what has been neither clearly nor adequately
addressed is the role and influence of federal policies and
pronouncements in the development of the legal paradigms through
which the desired and debated asset protection is today pursued. So
posited, there is a need for a broader perspective from which
consideration might be given to the evolution of today's burgeoning
creditor-protected trust environment and its likely future direction. It is
just such a perspective that informs and guides this Article, which at its
core seeks insight through an examination of the subtle, yet important,
shaping of the larger asset protection environment occasioned by a
legacy of federal influence upon protective trust devices that have long
been regarded as the province of state law. This divergent perspective
reveals that federal policy choices are fundamentally important to the
origins and evolution of the existing asset protection dynamic, and only
by reference to this understanding can more sound policy choices
affecting asset protection be achieved.
Fundamental to appreciating this federal undercurrent is a
recognition of what are loosely characterized here as two distinct
paradigms of the creditor-protected trust. Those paradigms are most
succinctly enunciated by reference to the basic rules that define each
paradigm and the identity of the beneficiary whose interest is protected,
as follows:
-The TraditionalParadigm,pursuant to which a settlor is permitted
under applicable state law to create a creditor-protected trust to be
enjoyed by a third-party beneficiary, as discussed more fully in Part II of
this Article; and
'The Self-Settled Paradigm,pursuant to which an individual settlor
is permitted under applicable state or offshore jurisdictional law to
establish and fund a creditor-protected trust to be enjoyed by that
funding individual settlor, as discussed more fully in Part III of this
Article.
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The analysis undertaken here, however, probes more deeply than
bare doctrinal rules. Specifically, this Article presents a critique of the
asset protection environment as grounded in both a modem conception
of the proffered paradigms and in recognition that each paradigm has
been uniquely influenced by federal pronouncements, policies, and
pursuits. Particular emphasis is placed upon the varying degrees of
federal influence exerted upon these paradigms through the arenas of
federal bankruptcy and tax policies. This view reveals also the
questionable roles of federalism and tax revenue concerns in shaping the
broader asset protection landscape. Consideration ultimately turns to the
potential interaction between an ideally purposive rubric of trust asset
protection, versus the less boundaried Traditional and Self-Settled
Paradigms currently supported under federalism-inspired bankruptcy
principles. Such analysis raises questions as to why, from a federal
perspective, considerations of purpose and equity-long dominant in the
evaluative asset protection trust commentary-are cast aside for little
apparent reason in the context of the federal policy choices affecting the
Traditional and Self-Settled Paradigms. Those policy choices are both
numerous and significant, and absent further exploration of this inquiry,
efforts to condemn, applaud, or otherwise critique the growing asset
protection phenomenon cannot possibly capture the true dimensions of
the issues presented. In short, any meaningful appreciation of the
currents affecting the modem asset protection dynamic requires a more
comprehensive understanding of the federal influences underlying the
development of the paradigms at issue in this Article.
A.

A Frameworkfor Elucidation

The noted paradigms interact and are in many respects branches of
the same tree. However, stepping away from variations on a single,
homogenous spendthrift trust categorization to instead conceptualize the
paradigms as distinct vehicles within the modern environment of asset
protection provides a framework from which to elucidate the important
federal influences that are the subject of this Article. In addition to
providing the underlying framework for exploration of such pursuits,
when the paradigms are separated and considered in this manner, it
becomes apparent that the paradigms are not a simple basket of "dead
law" to be gleaned from old commentaries and even older case law. The
Traditional Paradigm discussed in Part II of this Article, for example,
has recently been embodied within a completed Uniform Law
Commission project, with similarly fresh consideration occurring under
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the auspices of a Restatement project now in its final stages.6 In the
course of these important new projects addressing trust issues in a
broader context, it was the asset protection dynamic that generated the
most input from the practicing bar as well as the most vigorous debate
among the drafters.' As explained further in Part II, these troublesome
contemporary state law issues have firm roots in federal jurisprudence
dating back well over a century.
Further, the Self-Settled Paradigm has recently seen the abrogation
of what had been a longstanding and widely accepted prohibition against
protection for self-settled arrangements! The "self-settled" moniker
denotes an arrangement under which the same individual is not only the
settlor funding the trust, but also a trust beneficiary eligible to receive
distributions from the trust.9 In this regard, at least four United States
jurisdictions have since 1997 joined the ranks of numerous
entrepreneurial offshore jurisdictions in permitting an individual to
shelter assets from creditors in a trust arrangement that includes: (1) the
funding settlor as a trust beneficiary, and (2) a spendthrift provision
designed to thwart efforts by the settlor's creditors to reach the trust
property or the settlor's trust interest.'0 Where the spendthrift nature of
the self-settled arrangement is enforced, such a trust so fundamentally
departs from the limitations historically recognized under the Traditional
Paradigm that it is classified here as a paradigm unto itself." This
6. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 56-60 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999)
[hereinafter DRAFT RESTATEMENT]. See generally Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts,
Restatements, and Trends in American Trust Law at Century's End, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1877 (2000).
With respect to developments in the area of creditor protection under the Draft Restatement, see in
particular infra notes 39 and 94 and the accompanying text.
7. The exceptions to such protection proved to be a particularly difficult issue upon which to
achieve consensus. See Raymond H. Young, New Uniform Trust Code Modernizes and Clarifies
Rules Governing Trusts, 27 EST. PLAN. 108, 109 (Mar./Apr. 2000) (noting that exceptions to
efficacy of spendthrift trust provisions generated the most input from the ACTEC and ABA
advisors to the Uniform Trust Code); David M. English, Is There a Uniform Trust Act in Your
Future?, 14 PROB. & PROP., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 24, 30 ("Crafting the provisions ... on spendthrift
protection and the rights of a beneficiary's creditors to reach the trust proved to be the most difficult
task in drafting the Act. The area is controversial, and conflicting policy directions ... [led to
compromised] results.").
8. See Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law's Race to the Bottom?, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1043 (2000) (discussing the foundation for the historical prohibition
against self-settled trusts).
9. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1518 (7th ed. 1999).
10. See infra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
1I. With respect to this fundamental departure, see, for example, Sterk, supra note 8, at 1043
("[Elven more entrenched than spendthrift trust doctrine itself is the rule that a spendthrift provision
for the settlor's own benefit is unenforceable.") (footnote omitted). In fact, the origins of this
prohibition against self-settled spendthrift trusts can be traced to at least 1487. See 2A AUSTIN
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phenomenon is examined more thoroughly in Part III of this Article and
is shown to have roots in the burgeoning offshore trust industry and the
narrow congressional response thereto.12 One effect of that response has
been a shift in the perception of the offshore industry from one of tax
advantage to one of asset protection. 3 While the parameters of this SelfSettled Paradigm are briefly explored in Part III, more attentive
consideration is given to the legitimization of this asset protection reality
through analysis of certain federal bankruptcy and tax policy choices and
the activities thereby countenanced.
As discussed in Part IV, the exposition of the paradigms in
association with the activities through which federal policies are pursued
suggests that a more focused, comprehensive federal view be taken of
trust asset protection.' 4 In shaping that view, due regard should be given
to bankruptcy, tax, and more generally conceived social policy
considerations. In other words, and to borrow from a tried-and-true
metaphor, the creditor-protected trust landscape can be viewed as
populated by two distinct paradigmatic trees, spawned perhaps from
related seeds but in many respects nurtured in different ways by federal
influences. The perspective here is one from which those trees can be
surveyed, thus revealing a larger forest by reference to which more
coordinated federal policy decisions impacting trust asset protection
might be cultivated. As explored in Part IV, such decisions implicate not
only the future evolutionary direction of the paradigms, but also the very
survival of the paradigms as viable asset protective legal structures.
B.

Of Currents,Not Causes

The argument is not, however, that something monstrously federal
"caused" a particular paradigm to be exactly as it is today or that some
federal action should perforce stamp-out asset protection trust planning
altogether. Instead, the object here is to examine the extent to which a
federal undercurrent has at times moved one or more of the paradigms,
and if such movement is found, to consider both its rationales and
implications going forward. Those federal influences vary in both degree
and character, and they are explored here in large part from a selective
period perspective that guides this endeavor. In particular, the noted
WAKEMAN SCOTr & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 156 (4th ed. 1987)

(tracing the origin of this rule to the 1487 Statute of King Henry VH, Stat. 3 Hen. VII, c.4, which
voided conveyances in trust for the use of the transferor).
12. See infra notes 206-24 and accompanying text.
13. See Sterk, supra note 8, at 1048.
14. See infra notes 276-89 and accompanying text.
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conceptualization of paradigms and the federal currents affecting those
paradigms are presented in the context of two historical periods which
saw significant developments in or away from the Traditional Paradigm.
The period focused upon with the most attention in this Article began in
the mid-I 970s and continues through the present day. It has been during
this period that a variety of federal actions, pronouncements, and
omissions have unequivocally affected the Self-Settled Paradigm. Some
consideration of the Traditional Paradigm is also undertaken within the
context of this period, although the "Traditional" label suggests a need
to probe further into the historical origins of what at one time was
considered a uniquely American opportunity to shelter assets. 5 In this
vein, consideration begins in Part II of this Article a century earlier with
the Supreme Court's 1875 decision in Nichols v. Eaton,16 which serves
also to whet the appetite for something more contemporary and federally
directed. As to the historical, there is a rich and thorough debate
concerning the merits and shortcomings of spendthrift and other
variations of the creditor-protected trust, and while at times referenced,
that ongoing debate is not repeated here. 7 Instead, the creditor-protected
trust bent here is one of perspective, geared towards particular insights to
be gleaned from the larger federal view. To say more at this point,
however, is to merely delay the promised foray into the federal
influences upon the evolution of the creditor-protected trust paradigms.
II.

THE TRADITIONAL PARADIGM

The origins and parameters of the Traditional Paradigm present a
logical starting point for an exploration of the nature of trust asset
protection and the extent of the federal influence upon and interest in the
evolution of that dynamic. First discussed in this Part II, then, are the
15. See Friedman, supra note 5, at 572 (describing "a peculiarity of American trust law, the
spendthrift trust doctrine"); George P. Costigan, Jr., Those Protective Trusts Which Are Miscalled
"Spendthrift Trusts" Reexamined, 22 CAL. L. REV. 471, 474 (1934) ("[T]he doctrine [of spendthrift
trust law] is modem American ... .
16. 91 U.S. 716(1875).
17. It is not the purpose of this Article either to repeat or directly revisit the arguments of
Gray and others regarding the merits and demerits of spendthrift trust asset protection. Such
arguments, pro and con, are addressed in scores of scholarly articles and are summarized nicely in
GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§ 223 (rev. 2d ed. 1992); DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 58, reporter's note to cmt. a; and
ScoTt & FRATCHER, supra note 11,
§ 152. The authors of the Draft Restatement note that "Itihe

philosophical and policy debate about spendthrift trusts ...has continued for generations, still
without consistent or enduring resolution." DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, ch. 12 Introductory
Note. The focus here is more guided, though perhaps at times more general, and is pursued through
the perspective of federal policy.
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doctrinal considerations that define such parameters. Having laid that
foundation, consideration then moves more directly into the federal
influence at the roots of a Traditional Paradigm that is most often
evaluated by reference to state law doctrines and concerns. The
particular federally-inspired focus of that consideration is upon the 1875
Supreme Court decision in Nichols v. Eaton."
A.

The DoctrinalFoundation

Doctrinally, the creditor-protected trust paradigms conceptualized
here have in common the idea of beneficial enjoyment coupled with
some limitation or restraint upon the alienability of the trust interest. '9
Simply stated, beneficial enjoyment entails the grant to a beneficiary of
an equitable interest in trust property from which distributions might be
made to that beneficiary. 0 Superficially and by definition, the
beneficiary lacks any legal authority to transfer the underlying trust
property.2 ' Such authority instead resides with the person or entity (the
trustee) charged with managing the property with the best interests of the
beneficiary in mind.22 Absent a spendthrift or some other limitation,
however, the beneficiary would have full power to transfer her rights
and interests in the trust-including the right to receive distributions.23
Thus, those rights could be taken away from the beneficiary, either at the
beneficiary's doing or through involuntary transfer such as that
occasioned by creditor requisition. The concept of asset protection is
18.
19.

91 U.S. 716(1875).
See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND
ESTATES 553-94, 631-32 (6th ed. 2000).
20. See generally id.
21. See generally id.
22. For a basic exposition of these inherent trust characteristics, see, for example, id. at
557-62.
23. Thus, for example, the beneficiary could transfer her right to receive distributions of
income from the trust, but could not transfer any legal interest in the underlying trust property by
virtue of which income is earned in support of such distributions.
24. As to the manner in which a creditor might actually liquidate or realize upon the value of
a beneficiary's unprotected interest in a trust:
Except in the rare case in which a debtor is the sole beneficiary of a trust and can
presently demand conveyance of the trust property, a creditor cannot reach the trust
property itself. It is the beneficial interest of the debtor that is subjected to the claim. The
basic remedy of the creditor is to have the beneficial interest sold and the proceeds of the
sale applied to satisfy the claim. The buyer acquires the rights that the debtor owned as
beneficiary, whether it be the right to receive periodic income payments or the right to
share in the principal on termination. The element of sacrifice involved in a forced sale
of such rights is likely to work a hardship on the beneficiary [because the circumstances
of the sale are likely to yield a depressed value for the interest]. Consequently, courts
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interjected when the settlor, who establishes and funds the trust, crafts it
such that both the beneficiary and the beneficiary's assignees or
creditors are denied the ability to effect a transfer of the beneficiary's
trust interest. 5 Most often, the settlor will attempt to provide such
protection through one or more of the following:
.A forfeiture provision, pursuant to which the ability to alienate
the beneficiary's interest is indirectly restrained through a trust
provision stating that the beneficiary's interest will terminate
upon the beneficiary's bankruptcy or any attempt by the
beneficiary or her creditors
to alienate the beneficiary's
26
equitable trust interest;
*An anti-alienationor "spendthrift" provision, or some similar
expression of intent that the alienability of the beneficiary's
interest be directly restrained; 27 or
*A particulartype of beneficial interest, the inherent limitations
of which preclude either transfer by the beneficiary or
meaningful attachment by the beneficiary's creditors 28
It is not uncommon for trusts crafted with both maximum flexibility
and asset protection in mind to include a spendthrift provision and some
other compatible feature to better guarantee that the desired protection
will in fact be achieved. 29 That added feature is often provided through
the crafting of a particular type of beneficial interest, as contemplated in

[will] ... instead directl] that the trustee pay the creditor the distributions to which the
beneficiary is entitled .... If this milder remedy is inadequate ... the court will
normally direct a sale of the interest.
EUGENE F. SCOLES, ET AL., PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS
627 (6th ed. 2000).
25. It should be noted that sometimes this characteristic arises by operation of state law as
opposed to any specifically expressed intent of the settlor.
26. See, e.g., I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 150 (1959) (describing and recognizing
such a forfeiture provision as valid); SCOTr & FRATCHER, supra note 11, § 150 (discussing
forfeiture provisions).
27. For more on the definition of a "spendthrift trust" specifically, see supra note 4. With
respect to the distinction between direct and indirect restraints on alienation, see SCOTT &
FRATCHER, supra note I1, § 150.
28. See I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 154 cmt. b, 155 cmt. b (1959) (describing
that in "support trusts" and "discretionary trusts" it is the inherent "nature of the beneficiary's
interest rather than a provision forbidding alienation which prevents the transfer of the beneficiary's
interest").
29. See SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 11, § 151.1 (discussing the coordinate benefits of
trusts that include a restraint on the alienability of a discretionary or support interest).
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the third protective feature noted above. 0 In that regard, reference is
made specifically to two trust types commonly referred to individually
as "discretionary trusts" and "support trusts."'" A "support trust" is
defined simply as one in which the trustee's decision-making authority
to effect distributions is constrained by a standard that most often relates
to the beneficiary's health, education, maintenance, or support needs.32
This affords a degree of protection, because any distribution (to either
the beneficiary or a creditor) that is outside the scope of the specified
standard would exceed the trustee's authority, and would therefore be
prohibited.33 Also suggested, however, is a degree of protective
limitation, because the beneficiary's creditors may be able to force a
distribution in satisfaction of claims relating to the provision of goods or
services contemplated by the specified standard.34
More liberal is the "discretionary trust," by virtue of which "a
beneficiary is entitled only to so much of the income or principal as the
trustee in [the trustee's] uncontrolled discretion shall see fit to give [the
beneficiary, who] cannot compel the trustee ... to pay any part of the
trust property, nor can creditors of the beneficiary reach any part of the
trust property., 35 The discretionary trust has historically been recognized
at common law as providing a degree of protection from the
beneficiary's creditors, albeit by virtue of the nature of the beneficiary's
interest and not because of any particular anti-alienation provision

30. See id.
31. See id.§§ 154-55.
32. Such standards are often referred to as "ascertainable" in the estate tax context, and the
indicated proviso is often referred to as a "HEMS" standard among estate planning practitioners.
See 5 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND
GIF's 126.6.4 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing in the context of Internal Revenue Code § 2036(a)(1), the
transferor's right to income under a standard which may be asserted to compel a distribution to the
transferor, and those which might not be so enforced). Title 26 of the United States Code is often
referred to as the Internal Revenue Code, and is sometimes hereinafter referred to as the I.R.C.
33. See I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 154 cmt. b (1959); SCOTT & FRATCHER,
supra note 11, § 154; Elena Marty-Nelson, Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Having Your Cake
and Eating It Too, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 11,24 (1994).
34. ScoTr & FRATCHER, supra note 11, § 157.
35. Id. § 155 (footnotes omitted). For a standard definitional treatment of discretionary and
spendthrift trusts relying upon Restatement propositions, see Estate of Paxton v. Commissioner,86
T.C. 785, 804 n.12 (1986) (noting that a "discretionary trust" is a trust under the terms of which "'it
is provided that the trustee shall pay to or apply for a beneficiary only so much of the income and
principal or either as the trustee in his uncontrolled discretion shall see fit"') (quoting I
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 155(1) (1959)). The court further notes that "[a] spendthrift
provision provides that the interest of the beneficiary is inalienable and that creditors cannot reach
the interest in satisfaction of their claims." Id. at 817 n.31.
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included in the trust instrument.3 6 In this sense, then, it might be said that
a de facto restraint on the alienability of the beneficiary's interest is
achieved through particularized crafting of the discretionary or support
interest itself and notwithstanding the absence of any specific disabling
provision expressly stating the restraint." However, although a
discretionary or support trust need not rely upon the inclusion of a
spendthrift provision to achieve some measure of asset protection, the
inclusion of such a provision is clearly desirable from an asset protection
standpoint.38 In this regard, the discretionary and spendthrift forms are
36. See Twopeny v. Peyton, 10 Sim. 487, 59 Eng. Rep. 704 (1840), and other cases cited in
11, § 155, at 152 n.2; I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 155
cmt. b (1959); Marty-Nelson, supra note 33, at 24-25. More specifically, since the beneficiary is
often regarded under the law as having no "right" to receive a distribution except upon the trustee's
discretionary decision to make such a distribution, it is often said that absent the trustee's exercise
of such discretion, there is no enforceable interest available for the beneficiary to transfer or for a
creditor to attach. Further to this idea and in conclusory terms which have confounded both law
students and Restatement drafters alike, it is sometimes said that the beneficiary of a purely
discretionary trust has only a "mere expectancy" of receiving distributions and that such interest
falls short of the "property" right required for alienation (whether voluntary or at the behest of
creditors) to be possible. See generally SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 11, § 155 (discussing
protection afforded by virtue of the nature of the interest as discretionary); BOGERT & BOGERT,
supra note 17, § 228, at 721 (same).
37. See, e.g., ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 18 (2d ed. 1947) ("[T]rusts for
support have many elements in common with spendthrift trusts, and it is sometimes held that the
fact that the settlor expresses his intent that the interest of the beneficiary shall be for his support is
enough to show his intent to restrain the alienation of the interest .... ).
38. For example, where the trustee has exercised discretion to make a distribution or where
the trustee's discretion is limited to the particular timing or manner of an otherwise required
distribution, the beneficiary's interest is vulnerable in the absence of a spendthrift provision, as the
prospect of payment to the beneficiary is no longer subject to the trustee's absolute discretion to
withhold payment. "Moreover, if the trustee of a discretionary trust without a spendthrift or
forfeiture clause is served with process by a creditor of the beneficiary, he will be liable to the
creditor if he thereafter exercises his discretion and elects to pay the beneficiary." Marty-Nelson,
supra note 33, at 28. If a discretionary or support trust includes a spendthrift restraint (as should be
the case where creditor-protection is a planning objective), the issue is more easily resolved in that
the restraint will preclude most creditor claims from attaching to the trust interest in the first
instance. See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 504 cmt. (2000) (dealing with discretionary trust interests,
and noting: "This section will have limited application .... Only if the trust is not protected by a
spendthrift provision, or if the creditor falls within one of the exceptions to spendthrift
enforcement ... does this section become relevant"); DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 60 cmt.
a (dealing with discretionary trust interests, and noting: "The rule does not apply if the beneficiary's
interest is subject to a valid spendthrift restraint .... ). Both the UTC and Draft Restatement
authors attempt to further clarify the creditor-protected status of discretionary and support trusts
where a spendthrift restraint on alienation is lacking. The attempted UTC and Draft Restatement
clarification comes primarily in the form of directly confronting and then rejecting the often elusive
distinctions upon which protection for such non-spendthrifted trust interests often turn. See
generally Halbach, supra note 6, at 1895 (discussing problems with prior law treatment of
discretionary and support trust interests). Both models treat support trusts as simply a variant of the
discretionary trust, having a support standard to guide the exercise of discretion. Thus implicated is
SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note
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complimentary, frequently used in tandem, and often equated in terms of
operational effect upon rights of alienation.39
Rather than delve further into the finer points of such distinctions
and the myriad of combinations and variations attendant their use and
operative effect, it is more appropriate to simply recognize the foregoing
as a necessary precursor to appreciating the broader framework that shall
guide the direction of this Article. Indeed, the specific trust forms just
noted are all easily characterized as species within the larger genus of
what is conceptualized above as the Traditional Paradigm of the
creditor-protected trust. 40 Going forward, it is the spendthrift restraint
upon the alienability of the beneficiary's trust interest that provides both
a central paradigmatic theme and a most direct means to the settlor's
a more unified set of rules governing the vulnerability of a beneficiary's interest to creditor claims
where either a support of "purely" discretionary trust is involved. See UNIF. TRUST CODE
§ 504(b)(1) & cmt. (2000); DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 60, reporter's note to cmt. a
("[Tlhe supposed distinction ...[is] arbitrary and artificial ....'). Cf. I RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS §§ 154, 155 (1959) (providing separate treatment for discretionary and support trusts).
Both models then proceed to similarly reject the idea that the beneficiary of a discretionary trust
lacks the power to compel a distribution, thus rejecting also the idea that there is no interest for
creditors to attach. The UTC clarifies the idea that such a beneficiary actually does possess the right
to compel a distribution, but then simplifies the analysis by limiting that conclusion to only the
situation where the trustee has abused its discretion or failed to comply with a standard guiding that
discretion. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 504 & cmt. (2000). The UTC drafters further simplify the
matter by stating that such right belongs to the beneficiary alone, and thus creditors may not compel
a distribution from a discretionary trust to satisfy their claims. The lone creditor exception is for
dependent spouses and children, who are limited to the same rights to compel as held by the
beneficiary. See id. In contrast, the Draft Restatement provides that any creditor may compel a
distribution to the extent the beneficiary might do so, noting specifically that the rights of such
creditors are to be protected from trustee abuse of discretion. See DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note
6, § 60 cmt. e.
39. See, e.g., In re Bass, 171 F.3d 1016, 1028 (5th Cir. 1999) ("Discretionary Trusts are
similar in effect to a spendthrift trust in that ... the beneficiary cannot alienate the funds nor can
creditors reach the fund until the trustee's discretion has been exercised.") (footnote omitted); In re
Blackwell, 142 B.R. 301, 303 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992) ("The committee overseeing the
administration of the [pension plan which was in the nature of a trust] has complete discretion over
when to disburse the funds. Thus, until that decision is made, the pension trust is tantamount to a
spendthrift trust such that the property would be excluded from the bankruptcy estate."); see also
2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 11,§ 152 ("[Clourts do not always clearly appreciate the
distinction between spendthrift trusts and trusts for support and discretionary trusts ....
");id.
§ 155.1 ("The fact that discretion is conferred on the trustee to withhold income from the
beneficiary may indicate an attempt to prevent alienation, voluntary or involuntary, of the
beneficiary's interest.") (footnote omitted); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 17, § 228 ("The
discretionary trust effects an indirect restraint on alienation ....
");Anne S. Emanuel, Spendthrift
Trusts: It's Time to Codify the Compromise, 72 NEB. L. REV. 179, 185 (1993) (noting how the
discretionary nature of a trust interest can compliment the protection afforded solely by virtue of a
spendthrift restraint). With regard to the relevance of a spendthrift provision in a discretionary or
support trust, as dealt with under the UTC and the Draft Restatement, see supra note 38.
40. See supra Part 11.
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desired ends.4' With the foregoing ideas in mind, then, consideration
now shifts more directly to federal influences upon the evolution of asset
protection within the Traditional Paradigm.
B. Protection in Context
The concept of spendthrift asset protection received a pivotal
Supreme Court endorsement as the turn of the twentieth century
approached.42 To appreciate the unique relevance of that endorsement,
some context must be given to the legal environment in which the
Supreme Court acted. Further to this idea, as of 1875 a retrospective
view of the first century of the United States' existence saw economic
cycles and political disagreements that left a constitutionally-conferred
federal power to regulate the relationship between financially troubled
debtors and their creditors largely unexercised."3 By default, such
regulation fell to the states.4 When Congress did act, the result was
short-lived federal legislation that revealed the uncertain balance
between federal and state roles in regulating the various aspects of
41. The various avenues to asset protection that shape the Traditional Paradigm are without
question closely related. This interrelationship can be seen in the progression of protection and
enjoyment evidenced when moving from the forfeiture trust to the bare spendthrift trust to the
discretionary trust, as well as in the more pragmatic recognition that the bare spendthrift clause is
utilized most effectively in conjunction with such other measures in order to enhance the degree of
asset protection each such measure could provide in isolation. With regard to the relative advantages
of a spendthrift restraint, see supra note 38. With regard to this overlap in protective features, see
also supra note 39, and accompanying text. Thus, the Traditional Paradigm as conceptualized here
encompasses a combination of the asset protection features examined above, but always with the
spendthrift provision at its core. Most often, the added feature will appear in the form of a
discretionary trust interest. This combination of spendthrift and discretionary features appears
prominently, for example, in the self-settled spendthrift trust legislation first appearing on the scene
domestically in 1997, as discussed more fully in Part III.
42. The reference is to Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716 (1875), certain aspects of which are
discussed in more detail infra.
43. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4, confers upon Congress the power to promulgate "uniform
laws on the subject of bankruptcies." The history of federal legislation in the bankruptcy arena prior
to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, is detailed in Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the
Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. L. REV. 5, 13-14 (1995); Vern Countryman, A
History of American Bankruptcy Law, 81 COM. L.J. 226, 228-30 (1976); see also NAT'L BANKR.
REV. COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS, FINAL REPORT 118 (1997) [hereinafter
1997 FINAL REPORT] (noting that prior to 1898 Bankruptcy Act, various federal bankruptcy laws
impacting exemptions were in effect for a cumulative total of less than twenty years); David A.
Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV.
471, 477-78 (1994) ("Rather than a single, enduring bankruptcy statute, Congress passed a series of
laws ... in response to financial crises; each of these laws was repealed almost as soon as the
particular crises had passed." (footnotes omitted)).
44. See Tabb, supra note 43, at 13.
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bankruptcy, particularly with respect to delineating the property that
would be available to, or protected from, the claims of a bankrupt's
creditors.4 '5 From the slightly broader perspective of what today might be
dubbed the "asset protection rubric" of the period, it seems that prior to
1875 the concept of "spendthrifting" a person's interest in propertyeffectively immunizing such property from the claims of creditors
through the simple expedient of subjecting that interest to an antialienation provision-was a concept rejected under the English common
law and not otherwise embraced in this country. 6
Now that is not to say that the shielding of trust assets and interests
from creditors was not in any way recognized at this time. Trusts
including indirect restraints such as forfeiture provisions were permitted,
notwithstanding the continued rejection in England of the more direct

45. Although coverage was limited to particular categories of debtors, the Bankruptcy Act of
1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, and the Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5
Stat. 440, repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614, each provided for a completely
federal scheme of property which was to be exempted from creditors' claims, while the more
broadly applicable Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, repealed by Act of June 7, 1878,
ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99, provided for a minimum level of property to be exempt, although permitting
states to grant more generous property exemptions. See Tabb, supra note 43, at 14-20 (discussing
these first three bankruptcy acts); see also Countryman, supra note 43, at 229-30 (same); Raymond
C. Marier, Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: A Full Circle Back to the Act of 1800?, 53 CORNELL L.
REV. 663, 666 (1968).
46. See Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive
Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 6 n.17 (1995) ("Prior to Nichols, English and American cases
had held almost uniformly that disabling restraints [on alienation] were ineffective .... "); See
Alexander, supra note 3, at 1198 ("[N]ineteenth century English trust doctrines reinforced the
established common law doctrines restricting the power of settlors to impose restraints on the
alienability of their transferees' interests."). Regarding anti-alienation provisions and spendthrift
trusts more generally, see supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. On the topic of acceptance of
spendthrift trusts in England and in the pre-1875 United States, see also Brandon v. Robinson, 18
Ves. 429, 34 Eng. Rep. 379 (Ch. 1811) (rejecting spendthrift trust doctrine); Willard M. Bushman,
The (In)validity of Spendthrift Trusts, 47 OR. L. REV. 304, 306-09 (1968) (discussing historical
origins of the spendthrift trust). It would be incorrect to ignore the fact that the spendthrift trust had
been "recognized" in at least two states prior to 1875, although it would be perhaps even more
remiss to overlook the indirect and perhaps unintended manner in which such recognition came
about. Indeed, Bushman summarizes this "minority position" as consisting of "a decision in one
state, dictum in another, and statutes in four states which permitted restraints to a limited extent" in
dealing with broader legal issues. Id. at 306. Further insight on this aspect of the history of
spendthrift trust doctrine in this country can be found in GRAY, RESTRAINTS, supra note 1, § 214
(noting absence of courts of equity in Pennsylvania as affecting spendthrift doctrine); Hirsch, supra,
at 6 n.17 (summarizing this issue by reference to Gray, Griswold and other sources, with particular
emphasis upon New York law); Alexander, supra note 3, at 1198-1200 (discussing early English
and American law, with particular emphasis upon laws of New York and Pennsylvania).
The relationship between assets held in a trust that includes a spendthrift provision and
exempt property in a bankruptcy proceeding is discussed in more detail in Part III.B.
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spendthrift restraint.47 On a policy level, the forfeiture trust is
distinguished by the specific denial to the beneficiary of any enjoyment
of the trust property once bankruptcy occurs or creditors attempt to reach
the interest; i.e., the beneficiary's trust interest is simply forfeited upon
the happening of such event. 48 In contrast, the beneficiary protected by.
virtue of a direct restraint on alienation retains the prospect of further
enjoyment of her trust interest notwithstanding the thwarted creditors'
efforts to reach that interest or the trust property supporting it. 49 From the
settlor's perspective, although a forfeiture provision may protect the
underlying trust property from the claims of a beneficiary's creditors,
such a provision is unsatisfactory where a coextensive goal is to provide
ongoing benefits to the object of the settlor's bounty via the trust
interest. 0 It is this latter desire that is most effectively served through the
operation of some limitation-like a spendthrift provision-that allows
for continuation of the beneficiary's trust interest while precluding its
voluntary or involuntary transfer." Grounded in this distinction then, is
this prospect of continued enjoyment of spendthrifted property that is
immune from creditor claims, and therein lies one of the more
significant bases for the ongoing policy debate surrounding spendthrift
trusts.52 Reflecting on this very point, one noted commentator concluded
that "[i]t seems that it is not so much that the common law wants
creditors paid ... but that it is opposed to having debtors refuse to pay
creditors and still retain the property."53 A more opinionated statement of
the underlying fear was succinctly captured by Gray in his oft-quoted
1895 treatise conclusion that: "[t]he general introduction of spendthrift
trusts would be to form a privileged class, who could indulge in every
speculation... and yet... roll in wealth. 54
47. With respect to forfeiture provisions, see supra text accompanying note 26. Regarding
prior English precedent, see supra note 46.
48. See Marty-Nelson, supra note 33, at 23.
49. This is particularly so if the beneficiary emerges from a federal bankruptcy proceeding
with a discharge of all prior debts, while the trust interest remains intact. See infra note 122. The
status of protected trusts in bankruptcy is developed more fully beginning in Part III.B.
50.

See, e.g., Sco-r & FRATCHER, supra note I1, § 150.

51. See Emanuel, supra note 39, at 185 (discussing this distinction).
52. See, e.g., Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., N.A., 577 N.E.2d 1077, 1083 (Ohio 1991) ("The
most important argument against spendthrift trusts is that they are unfair to the beneficiary's
creditors because they allow the beneficiary to enjoy the trust property without paying his debts.").
The court goes on to deny this objection "both logically and as a matter of policy." Id.; see also
ScoT" & FRATCHER, supra note 11, § 150 (distinguishing forfeiture provisions from spendthrift
provisions by reference to the ability to continue to enjoy the trust property in the case of a
spendthrift trust).
53. Costigan, supra note 15, at 480.
54. GRAY, RESTRAINTS, supra note 1, § 262.
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The 1875 Nichols v. Eaton55 Supreme Court decision inspired a
change in the operative legal landscape. Consideration of that decision
here however, presents less a penultimate resolution of the matter at
hand than it does an opportunity to develop a particular point of view,
thus building momentum towards more concrete applications of that
view. Likewise, and as discussed more thoroughly below, the
significance of Nichols lies in its dictum and the views thereby
advanced, more so than in the particular holding of the case. The point
of the Nichols dictum was to endorse protections, like those garnered
from a spendthrift restraint, as legitimate and defensible asset protection
devices.56 The point here, again, is to illuminate a legacy of federal
impact upon what is commonly regarded as the province of state trust
law. 7
The settlor of the trust at issue in Nichols attempted to provide a
degree of protection coupled with continued enjoyment that was akin to
that underlying the noted criticisms of spendthrift restraints. 8 This
prompted the creditor's assignee to argue that enforcing the trust
protections would amount to accepting a fraud upon creditors.59
Specifically, the trust at issue in Nichols initially provided for mandatory
distributions of income to the settlor's son during the son's lifetime.60
Then and now, a settlor's grant of such a bare mandatory trust interest
generally provides no asset protection whatsoever. 6' This is because,
without a forfeiture or spendthrift restraint, creditors of the beneficiary
can attach the beneficiary's trust interest and receive those mandated
trust distributions in the beneficiary's stead.62 Had the son's interest

55. 91 U.S. 716 (1875).
56. See id. at 727.
57. As noted in this Article's introduction, supra Part I, the view here is one that pursues a
federal perspective on what has typically been regarded as the province of state trust law. While
revealing the federal role that is central to that view, the period perspective adopted here is at times
painted with a broad brush in order to maintain focus upon the array of federal actions,
pronouncements, and seeming omissions that have influenced the paradigms, with tailored
consideration of the Traditional and Self-Settled Paradigms undertaken in that regard.
58. See Nichols, 91 U.S. at 727; DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 57 cmt. c.
59. See Nichols, 91 U.S. at 717-18.
60. See id. at 717. Such a trust is hereinafter referred to as a "mandatory trust."
61.
62.

See SCOLES, ET AL., supra note 24, at 437.
See I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 155 cmt. c (1959) ("If by the terms of the

trust the trustee must pay to or apply for the beneficiary the whole or any part of the income or
principal, the interest of the beneficiary can be reached by his transferee or creditor, unless the trust
is a spendthrift trust .... "). The creditor, of course, may prefer to sell the interest once attached, so
as to receive presently the value represented by the future distributions. See SCOLES, ET AL., supra
note 24. From an asset protection standpoint, another key weakness of a spendthrift trust in which
the nature of the beneficiary's interest is mandatory is that as a general proposition, once distributed
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simply been forfeited upon assignment or creditor pressure or devolved
such that the son was left with only a discretionary or support interest as
one of a group of several beneficiaries, the proffered protection would
have been easily honored by the Court.63 In this case, however, the
settlor had provided that upon such financial distress, the son's
mandatory income interest converted to a purely discretionary one, for
the son alone and pursuant to which the trustee could at any time or
manner and for any reason thereafter distribute the subject property to
the son. 64 The Court held that the required forfeiture of the son's
mandatory right to distributions and the substitution in lieu thereof of
rights purely discretionary in nature placed the son's interest on the
proper side of the line dividing those cases where creditors were denied
access to a trust interest versus those where creditors succeeded.6' But to
the Court, so holding was not a sufficient point at which to conclude
consideration of the matters implicated.
Instead, the Supreme Court engaged in a digression that even the
Court noted was directed less at resolving the matter at hand than at
open rejection of the view espoused under prior English precedent.66
That precedent invalidated settlor imposed direct restraints on the
alienation of an equitable trust interest.67 Specifically, the Court directly
challenged the prevailing asset protection trust dynamic by forcefully

and placed in the hands of the beneficiary, the former trust property is no longer protected by the
spendthrift nature of the trust. See I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 152 cmt. j (1959);
DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 58 cmt. d. Thus, to provide any real measure of asset
protection, trusts created within the framework of the Traditional Paradigm will include (if
effectively crafted) both a spendthrift clause and some other compatible mechanism to better
guarantee that the desired protection will in fact be achieved.
63. See Nichols, 91 U.S. at 722. This variation of the forfeiture trust is most commonly known
as a "protective trust" and is-like its forfeiture trust counterpart but unlike the pure spendthrift
trust-clearly accepted under modem English law. See ScoTr & FRATCHER, supra note 11, § 150
(acknowledging validity of the protective trust and citing both English and U.S. precedent). Unlike a
forfeiture trust where the beneficiary is effectively separated from her trust interest entirely upon the
happening of a specified event, under the protective trust rubric the triggering event converts the
beneficiary's status from that of a mandatory income beneficiary into merely one of several
discretionary beneficiaries. In other words, the protective trust by its terms automatically converts
from a mandatory trust to a discretionary trust upon threat of creditor attachment. See generally id.
§§ 150, 155 (discussing protective trusts and their utility and validity under English law, where
spendthrift trusts are not permitted to this day); DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 57 cmt. c
(discussing protective trusts in a manner virtually identical to that at issue in Nichols, 91 U.S. at
718).
64. See Nichols, 91 U.S. at 722-23. See generally Emanuel, supra note 39, at 186-88
(discussing the posture of the Nichols case).
65. See Nichols, 91 U.S. at 724-25.
66. See id. at 725.
67. See supra note 46 regarding prior precedent.
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opining "that [trust] property may ...be enjoyed by ...an individual

without liability for his debts being attached as a necessary incident to
his enjoyment., 68 As to the nature of this gratuitous federal digression, it
has been critically stated that "in addition to being an unwarranted
dictum, [the endorsement] was also an 'unconstitutional' interference by
a Federal Court on a matter of state law., 69 Nevertheless, with the
Nichols pronouncement and the arguments proffered in support thereof,
the propriety of trust interests protected without forfeiture, and in
particular the spendthrift trust and the unguided asset protection
incidents it afforded, were indelibly etched upon the tapestry of
American legal discourse." Although completely lacking in precedential
effect upon trust laws historically crafted at the state level in the
federalism landscape of American jurisprudence, the Supreme Court's
foray into this state-dominated area has been recognized as both a
"startling novelty" 7' as well as "the greatest single factor in the
establishment of spendthrift trusts in the United States,"" providing what
in another commentator's opinion is "the foundation upon which the
American spendthrift-trust doctrine is built."73 Indeed, the leading critic
68. Nichols, 91 U.S. at 725.
69. GRISWOLD, supra note 37, § 29, at 27-28 (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938)). Griswold notes also that "[tihe decision was clearly contrary to the local law in the state
where the case arose." See also GRAY, RESTRAINTS, supra note 1,§ 254, at 238 (noting decision
was grounded in "ill-considered dictum"); Friedman, supra note 5, at 573 ("The trust in question [in
Nichols] was not strictly speaking a spendthrift trust ....). For a more recent and less impassioned
consideration of the matter, see Emanuel, supra note 39, at 186-88.
70. See Friedman, supra note 5, at 572-74; Emanuel, supra note 39, at 186-88.
7!. GRAY, RESTRAINTS, supra note 1,§ 254, at 238.
72. GRISWOLD, supra note 37, § 26; see also DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 58, at
434 reporter's note to cmt. a (quoting Griswold on this point). Griswold goes on to note that shortly
after the Nichols decision, influential text writers of the day had revised their works to embrace the
Nichols dictum as law. See GRISWOLD, supra note 37, § 30(4), at 28.
73. Bushman, supra note 46, at 307; see also GRAY, RESTRAINTS, supra note 1, at v ("It is
impossible to read the later cases without seeing the great power with which the argument of the late
Mr. Justice Miller, in the case of Nichols v. Eaton, has been in the spread of spendthrift trusts.");
Sterk, supra note 8, at 1042 n.46 ("Judicial enforcement of spendthrift trusts can be traced to two
leading decisions," citing Nichols, 91 U.S. 716 (1975)); Broadway Nat'l Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass.
170 (1882)); Emanuel, supra note 39, at 179 n.l ("I date the [spendthrift trust] controversy from the
dictum of Justice Miller in Nichols v. Eaton ....); Id. at 186-88 (discussing historical importance
of Nichols decision in the development of this country's spendthrift trust doctrine, but criticizing
Justice Miller's rationales). Again, however, it is not the purpose here to argue that the Supreme
Court's dictum in Nichols was the sole force guiding the acceptance of spendthrift trusts in this
country. Although it is clear that the case was at the forefront of shaping judicial thought on this
topic, the subsequent state court decision in Broadway National Bank and other dynamics of the
legal, financial and social fabric of the day should also be noted. See generally Alexander, supra
note 3, at 1201-08 (discussing the Nichols decision in the broader context of restraints on alienation
as evolved during the period 1875-1900); Friedman, supra note 5, at 582-83 (discussing the broader
economic and social climate of the day in relation to the development of spendthrift trust doctrine).
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of the day went so far as to conclude that the tide would likely have
turned against the acceptability of such protected trusts had Miller's
arguments been levied with equal force in the negative." These and
similar authorities support the notion that this pronouncement from the
highest federal bench was profoundly influential in the formative stages
of the domestic asset protection movement. 5 Yet, the legacy of Nichols
endures in more subtle ways, as discussed next.
C. The Nichols Arguments and Influence Examined More Closely
To better appreciate the continuing significance of the Supreme
Court's 1875 decision, it is appropriate to examine more closely Justice
Miller's rationales posited in favor of permitting settlor-imposed
restraints on the alienability on trust interests. 76 It is in the articulation of

those rationales that the most enduring influence of the Nichols decision
resides.
1. Freedom of Disposition
In support of the efficacy of such protected trusts, Justice Miller
relied foremost in Nichols upon the argument that a donor should be
permitted to dispose of her property for the benefit of a specified
individual, without the courts usurping that freedom by including the
favored individual's creditors in the class of persons entitled to benefit
from the trust property. Succinctly stated, Justice Miller argued that
"the rule of public policy which subjects a debtor's property to the
payment of his debts, does not subject the property of the donor to the
debts of his beneficiary ....,7 Justice Miller clearly framed the

argument in terms of deference to the donor's freedom of disposition,
with the only limitation thereon being that derived from public policy
considerations. 9 The result elevated the donor's goals, and consequently
74. See GRAY, RESTRAINTS, supra note 1,at v.
75. As to the significance of this dictum emanating from the U.S. Supreme Court in
particular, Griswold observed that "[t]he prominence of the Court gave the opinion wide circulation,
and it was not many years before the dictum ... had been cited and followed to make law in many
jurisdictions." GRISWOLD, supra note 37, § 29(3), at 26.
76. In this vein and in light of the discussions of the Self-Settled Paradigm which follow, it is
important to recall that with regard to the Traditional Paradigm, the trust asset protection spoken of
is limited to that pursued by a trust settlor on behalf of another person as trust beneficiary.
77. See Nichols, 91 U.S. at 724.
78. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 133 Mass. at 174. This Massachusetts case is the leading state
court decision embracing the spendthrift trust. See supra note 73.
79. The public policies specifically referenced were those pertaining to the Rule Against
Perpetuities, the rule against excessive trust accumulations, and that proscribing the perpetuation of
frauds against creditors. See Nichols, 91 U.S. at 725. With regard to the impact of public policy

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol31/iss1/2

20

Eason: Developing the Asset Protection Dynamic: A Legacy of Federal Conc

20021

THE ASSET PROTECTION DYNAMIC

the trust beneficiary's status as the object of the donor's largess, over the
creditor status of other third parties.8 ° The momentum occasioned by this
analytical shift helped to produce a steady progression in the law away
from the more purposive asset protection trust, respected by reason of
the legally or mentally impaired status of its beneficiaries and their
consequent need for protection, to a doctrine focused upon the trust
settlor's rights and desires.8 ' As one author commenting on the heels of
this evolution put it:
the need of protection for the [beneficiary] was not stressed in the
spendthrift trust cases, but the supposed freedom of the donor to
protect his own acquired property from the creditors of his donee was
emphasized, with the result that... [spendthrift trust settlors] ... were
permitted to provide for the beneficiaries of such trusts ...incomes of
any amount-no matter how large-free from the claims of the
beneficiaries' creditors ... [and regardless of] the need of the
beneficiaries for protection ...

Lest there be any doubt as to the influence this aspect of Justice
Miller's opinion has exerted in affecting the course of the Traditional
Paradigm-and in particular regarding the acceptability and rationales
underlying the spendthrift component thereof-one need simply note
that the arguments delivered from the highest federal bench in Nichols
continue over a century later to influence important state decisions as to
the efficacy of the spendthrift trust. 3
2. Exemption Laws and Creditor Reliance
In addition to directly challenging the then-prevailing view of
donor-imposed spendthrift restraints, Justice Miller articulated another
considerations in the context of enforcing spendthrift restraints under the Self-Settled Paradigm, see
infra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 3, at 1249 ("Approval of the restraints represented an
unacknowledged but practically evident choice in favor of beneficiaries rather than creditors and
others with whom beneficiaries deal."); Friedman, supra note 5, at 580-81 (noting the various
decisions reflected more of a conclusion than any sound policy distinction, and discussing the
various parties having an interest in the trust relationship and their status relative to that conclusion).
81. See Bushman, supra note 46, at 307-08.
82. Costigan, supra note 15, at 483.
83. See Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., N.A., 577 N.E.2d 1077, 1082 (Ohio 1991) (citing
Nichols and Justice Miller's freedom of disposition argument as proffered in Nichols as "most
persuasive" in reasoning that prior Ohio precedent rejecting spendthrift trusts should be reversed);
see also Sligh v. First Nat'l Bank, 704 So. 2d 1020, .1025-27 (Miss. 1997) (citing Nichols and
echoing the arguments posited by Justice Miller as among the strongest favoring the enforcement of
spendthrift protections, but ultimately rejecting enforcement on the particular facts). With regard to
the Sligh decision, see infra note 94.
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line of reasoning that demonstrates the important collateral influences
that more specific debtor-creditor laws and policies exert in the asset
protection trust arena. That influence still pertains today and will be
shown to derive in part from the modem association of various asset
protection planning opportunities countenanced under federal law. For
the moment, the core association is revealed by the appeal in Nichols to
the operative effect of state exemption laws as supporting what Justice
Miller argued to be a similar exemption of spendthrift trust interests 4
Specifically, at the time of the Nichols decision the various debtorcreditor laws then in effect at the state level (and deferred to under
federal law)85 generally provided that certain property of a debtor would
not be made available for creditor attachment and liquidation in
satisfaction of creditor claims. 8 6 Simply stated, the affected property was
rendered "exempt" from such claims." Seizing upon the reality that "[t]o
property so exempted the creditor has no right to look.., as a means of
payment," Justice Miller argued that the same result should hold true
with respect to the assets and interests implicated in the case of a
spendthrift trust.8"
Not satisfied with the bare analogy from exemption to trust law,
however, Justice Miller utilized the similarity between the creditor rights
consequences of exemption laws and donor-imposed restraints in order
to refute another early argument levied against the recognition of such
protected trusts.89 This anti-protected trust argument stated that such
trusts serve to defraud creditors by allowing the trust beneficiary to
exude-through enjoyment of the protected trust interest-the
appearance of a person having the means to repay her debts, thus
unfairly and deceptively influencing creditors' decisions to extend
credit.9" In response, Justice Miller argued that creditors have no more
right or expectation of looking to spendthrift trust property for the
84. See Nichols, 91 U.S. at 726. Exploration of this aspect of Nichols presages a more detailed
discussion of modem federal bankruptcy exemptions and exclusions which follows in Part Ill. The
specific treatment of spendthrift trust interests under current federal bankruptcy laws is discussed in
the text accompanying infra notes 131-42.
85. See supra notes 42-46 regarding the state-federal legal landscape concerning bankruptcy
matters, as of the time of the Nichols decision.
86. With respect to the concept of exempt property generally, see William T. Vukowich,
Debtors' Exemption Rights Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C. L. REV. 769 (1980). For
federal bankruptcy legislation in effect prior to and at the time of the Nichols decision, see supra
note 45.
87. See Nichols, 91 U.S. at 726.
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 721-22.
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repayment of debts than to property immune from such claims under
exemption laws. 9' In other words, if this "creditor reliance" argument
fails with respect to exempt property, it likewise fails with respect to
spendthrift trust property. 92 The argument essentially is that the creditor
is on notice that by legal strictures a person may have at her disposal
certain property that is not available to satisfy such person's debts.93
Therefore, the creditor who fails to investigate the security of its credit
extension more deeply than the mere outward appearance of wealth does
so at its peril.94 While Justice Miller's refutation of this creditor reliance
argument remains influential in its own right today, 95 it is Justice
Miller's general association of legally sanctioned creditor-protected

91. See id. at 726.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. As has been oft-noted since Justice Miller's digression in Nichols, the argument favoring
protection of trust interests on the grounds that creditors have only themselves to blame upon
finding a debtor's assets beyond reach is valid only with respect to voluntary contract creditors. The
argument fails outright where the creditor is an involuntary tort plaintiff seeking to realize upon a
judgment against the protected trust beneficiary. See, e.g., GRISWOLD, supra note 37, § 555
(recognizing this distinction between the two classes of creditors relative to the spendthrift trust
rationale). Although a limitation upon the protective aspects of a trust falling within the Traditional
Paradigm has long been suggested with respect to such tort creditors, it has generally failed to make
headway into spendthrift trust law in actual operation. For example, Griswold proposed a model act
that, among other interesting features, permitted tort creditors to access the income from a trust the
interests in which were otherwise restricted as to alienability. See id. § 565 (proposed act § 2(c)).
This exception "was adopted in a couple of early statutes (Oklahoma and Louisiana) but thereafter
has not generally had much influence on legislation or judicial decisions..." DRAFT
RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 59 & reporter's note to cmt. a. The UTC and Draft Restatement
authors similarly opted to omit any such exception from their pronouncements, UNIF. TRUST CODE
§ 503 & cmt. (2000); DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 59 & reporter's note to cmt. a., despite
the possible impetus that might have been derived from the widely noted 1997 Mississippi case of
Sligh v. First National Bank, 704 So. 2d 1020 (Miss. 1997). In Sligh, the state court opined that a
trust beneficiary's gross negligence bordering on intentional conduct was a sufficient justification to
override the discretionary-spendthrift nature of the trust at issue so as to permit the tort victim to
satisfy his judgment against the trust beneficiary out of trust property. See id. at 1028. Ultimately,
the Sligh decision failed to carry the day, even in the jurisdiction in which rendered. See Miss.
CODE. ANN. § 91-9-503 (1999) (codifying protection of certain trust interests, without exception for
tort claimants); see also Scheffel v. Krueger, 782 A.2d 410 (N.H. 2001) (tort judgment debtor's
interest in spendthrift trust held protected under statute, and public policy arguments based on
criminal nature of beneficiary's sexual assault upon minor plaintiff deemed beyond court's purview
to consider. See generally Steven J. Oshins & Christopher M. Riser, Scheffel v. Krueger: The
Effectiveness of Statutory Spendthrift Trust Protection, TR. & EST., Oct. 2001, at 12, 14 (discussing
the Scheffel decision); Charles D. Fox, IV & Rosalie Murphy, Are Spendthrift Trusts Vulnerable to
a Beneficiary's Tort Creditors?, TR. & EST., June 1998, at 6 (criticizing the result in Sligh and
noting dearth of authority to support the court's holding). Regarding the exception of other creditors
from the protections otherwise afforded a spendthrift trust interest, see also infra notes 145-47 and
accompanying text.
95. This idea is developed more fully infra Part III.
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trusts with the exempt property scheme that is most significant in the
modern era of self-settled asset protection.
It must be noted, however, that from a policy standpoint, the appeal
to exemption laws in Nichols was somewhat misplaced. Specifically,
although "spendthrift trust laws have some of the attributes of exemption
laws[,]" the two doctrines are grounded in distinct policies.96 On the one
hand, both state and federal exemption policies are premised upon the
longstanding tenant that such exemptions exist for the primary purpose
of fostering the greater social good through granting to debtors a "fresh
start." 97 This fresh start objective dictates that in the case of bankruptcy
or insolvency, certain property should be shielded from creditor claims
so as to provide the debtor with a base of resources sufficient to allow
the debtor to pursue a productive lifestyle geared to a more successful
financial future, in lieu of that debtor becoming a public charge by virtue
of "losing everything" to creditors. 9 That such exemptions persist today
speaks to the efficacy of this fresh start objective and its concern for the
debtor's long-term financial recovery and well-being. 99
In contrast, the spendthrift trust "exemption" so equated in Nichols
is at its core grounded in deference to a donor's freedom of disposition,
completely disassociated from any concept of a fresh start policy basis
for allowing assets to be protected. ° Indeed, two major policy criticisms
of recognizing spendthrift trust restrictions cut directly against an
96. William T. Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights, 62 GEO. L.J. 779, 790 (1974).
Vukowich cites I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 149 cmt. a (1959), for describing a
beneficiary's interest in a spendthrift trust as "exempt." With regard to other justifications asserted
in favor of recognizing spendthrift trust protections, see generally the sources cited supra note 17.
To the extent the posited justification lies in some concept of beneficiary infirmity, see supra notes
80-83 and accompanying text.
97. The underlying fresh start policy is the same, regardless of whether the exemption is
derived at the state or federal level. The federalism dispute arises, however, over that derivationi.e., whether it should be state or federal law that identifies the specific property that is to be
exempted in furtherance of this fresh start objective. For a modem example of this federalism
dispute, see infra note 204.
98. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 126 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6087; G.
Marcus Cole, The Federalist Cost of Bankruptcy Exemption Reform, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 227, 228
(2000) (noting that the fresh start objective is a "central justification for a consumer bankruptcy
system. Productive but unfortunate individuals might decline to contribute to society if the benefits
of their past productive energies were completely captured by creditors.") (citations omitted); see
also Vukowich, supra note 86, at 769; Judge William Houston Brown, Political and Ethical
Considerations of Exemption Limitations: The "Opt Out" as Child of the First and Parent of the
Second, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 149, 163-70 (1997).
99. The focus here is upon the bankrupt debtor and, ultimately, the interplay between federal
bankruptcy doctrine and state exemption laws. For consideration of the role of state exemption laws
in a state nonbankruptcy setting, see Brown, supra note 98, at 181.
100. See Vukowich, supra note 96, at 791.
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association with exemption policies. Those spendthrift criticisms are that
such protections (1) may actually discourage a productive lifestyle going
forward, and (2) are not generally limited in degree by any fresh start or
other needs-based criteria.' ° ' Evaluated in this more thoughtful light, the
appeal to exemption laws in Nichols may be logically sound as a
response to creditor reliance arguments, but, from a broader policy
perspective, perhaps less indicative of sound reasoning than might
otherwise appear.
Notwithstanding this policy disconnect between exemption laws
and spendthrift trust doctrine, however, the underlying premise of the
appeal in Nichols to state exemption laws appears to have retained its
vitality as a defense of trust asset protection.' 2 The underlying
premise-that protected assets visit no fraud upon the diligent creditoris frequently cited today in connection with creditor-protected trust
interests. For example, one federal circuit court recently noted, in
denying creditor access to a trust, that: "[w]hen it extended the credit
that it [now] seeks to collect from [the debtor's] (remaining) interest in
[the spendthrift trust], the [creditor] ...should have recognized that this
wealth could not be reached in a bankruptcy action."'' 3 A key reason this

101. For what is perhaps the most impassioned refutation of the association in Nichols between
exemption laws and spendthrift trust doctrine, see Bushman, supra note 46, at 312. See also
Vukowich, supra note 96, at 791 ("[S]pendthrift trusts do not reflect a state policy of debtor
protection."); GRAY, RESTRAINTS, supra note 1, § 262 (criticizing spendthrift trust protections as
fostering a "privileged class," as discussed in the text accompanying supra note 54). As to
weaknesses in the creditor reliance response, see supra note 94. For more on spendthrift trust policy
arguments, see supra note 17.
102. See SCOrT & FRATCHER, supra note 11, § 155.
103. In re Baker, 114 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 1997). The Seventh Circuit in Baker was dealing
with a pension trust that included a spendthrift provision, as required under federal pension laws.
See id. at 638-39. The federal spendthrift provision is mandated under ERISA § 206(d)(1), 29
U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1995), and is also setforth as a requirement for certain favorable tax
consequences at 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) (1994). See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 ("ERISA") Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at various sections of Title
29 (labor provisions) and Title 26 (tax provisions) of the United States Code). The federal
spendthrift provisions embrace language that "looks strikingly like language describing a traditional
spendthrift trust." Lawrence B. Wohl, Pension and Bankruptcy Laws: A Clash of Social Policies, 64
N.C. L. REV. 3, 16 (1985). Thus, ERISA arguably gives rise to what could, in the context of this
Article, be loosely characterized as a third paradigm of the creditor-protected trust. Relative to the
paradigms conceptualized supra Part I.A., a third paradigm so conceived would be described as
follows:
-The Federal Retirement Paradigm,pursuant to which an individual, acting directly or
through an employer, may be permitted-indeed encouraged by virtue offederal law-to
establish and fund a tax-favored, creditor-protected trust or related arrangement to be
enjoyed by that individual, typically under the ambit of furthering such individual's
income security during retirement years.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2002

25

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 2

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:23

spendthrift/exemption association persists is that, both spendthrift trust
doctrine and exemption laws implicate the ability to enjoy property that
is in some manner maintained beyond the reach of creditor claims. 0' The
noted policy disconnect is often overlooked in the face of this pragmatic
observation.
That the underlying spendthrift/exemption policies differ, yet
produce what appear to be equivalent asset protection results, is perhaps
most important in the realm of perceptions as to the acceptable
boundaries of planning for the possibility of financial peril.' °5 Justice
Miller's observations certainly advanced the perception of equivalent
acceptability in this regard. This conclusion is supported by the
observations of one early commentator who, recognizing the spendthrift
trust analogy to exemption law as "makeweight" relative to the freedom
of disposition justification for spendthrift trusts, nevertheless proceeded
to equate the fundamental restraint on alienation aspect of creditorprotected spendthrift trust doctrine with bankruptcy exemptions in the
important context of societal attitudes concerning debtor-creditor
relations:
The community's attitude toward the debtor-creditor relationship will
be especially important [to the viability of spendthrift and similar
restraints on alienation], since most restraints serve to protect debtors'
assets from the claims of creditors. Although society generally is in
favor of upholding and enforcing private obligations, the intensity of

Although this conceptualization presents many interesting possibilities and ties quite firmly into the
prospect of an overriding federal interest in the spendthrift trust landscape, developing this idea of a
Federal Retirement Paradigm would consume and transform the balance of this Article, and will
thus not be pursued further here. For example, appreciating the Federal Retirement Paradigm
requires, at a minimum, an understanding of: (1)the complex tax structure through which federal
retirement policy is pursued; (2) the overriding policy objective, which is retirement income
security; and (3) the primary mechanisms of social security, private pension plans and personal
savings, through which that policy objective is pursued. Moreover, although the trust form
dominates arrangements in the employer-sponsored retirement plan context, any consideration of a
Federal Retirement Paradigm would by necessity have to address retirement-associated vehicles like
the Individual Retirement Arrangement ("IRA"), which may or may not take the form of a trust and
which may or may not be employer-sponsored. Thus, such ideas are alluded to here, but their
development is left for another day.
104. Indeed, it is this characteristic of the creditor-protected trust that is most often cited as
objectionable. See, e.g., Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., N.A., 577 N.E.2d 1077, 1083 (Ohio 1991)
("The most important argument against spendthrift trusts is that they are unfair to the beneficiary's
creditors because they allow the beneficiary to enjoy the trust property without paying his debts.").
105. See, e.g., In re Baker, 114 F.3d at 640.
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this feeling is not uniform, as is demonstrated by the differences in
homestead exemptions .... '06
It is to such societal attitudes and the pragmatic appeal and
influence of this protected trust/exemption association to which this
Article now turns, in pursuit of a more contemporary analysis of federal
influence upon the concept of asset protection across the trust
paradigms.
III.

THE SELF-SETTLED PARADIGM AND THE BANKRUPTCY/TAX
DYNAMIC: A SHIFT IN PERSPECTIVE

Discussion has thus far focused upon the last quarter of the
nineteenth century, and in particular the momentum occasioned by the
express endorsement and defense of donor-imposed spendthrift trust
protections in the Supreme Court's 1875 Nichols v. Eaton decision. 7
Historical episodes of federal venturing into the bankruptcy arena both
prior to and during this era have been alluded to, with the objective of
providing some degree of context to the larger legal landscape attending
that judicial decision. Among other insights, this exposition revealed the
articulation of an association between exemption laws and trust asset
protection. That association and its sometimes subtle shaping of
perceptions remain important today, and the relevance of that association
is enhanced by a more expansive modern federal foray into the realm of
debtor-creditor relations-and paradoxically by limitations imposed by
Congress upon that federal venture.
More specifically, modern federal bankruptcy laws (and certain
deferrals thereunder to state exemption laws) are fundamentally
important to understanding both the current status of and federal
influences upon the creditor-protected trust paradigms at issue here.
With this in mind, the focus of this Article and its period perspective
now shift a century forward, to the era beginning circa 1975 and
continuing through the present day, with only an occasional glance
backwards as context so demands. It is within this time-frame that
federal, state, and offshore influences have provided considerable
direction and momentum in the progress from the third-party beneficiary
focus of protection under the Traditional Paradigm towards the more
settlor-oriented protection at issue under the Self-Settled Paradigm." 8 As
106. Manning, supra note 3, at 373-74. Homestead exemptions are discussed in more detail
infra Part II:B.
107. See 91 U.S. 716, 725 (1875).
108. See supra Part III.A-B.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2002

27

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 2

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:23

discussed in more detail below,'09 for example, the mid-1970s saw the
enactment of a new bankruptcy code and new foreign trust tax
provisions, both of which must be considered in relation to their impact
upon the evolution of the trust paradigms at issue here.
In developing these ideas, consideration is first given to the recent
emergence domestically of the Self-Settled Paradigm. The purpose of
such initial consideration is to lay the foundation for understanding the
paradigm, such that issues more pertinent to the theme and thesis of this
Article can then be explored with understanding.'"0 Thus, discussion in
this Part III soon turns to select developments in the bankruptcy arena
from the mid-1970s through the present day, with particular emphasis
upon the thoroughly considered federal choice to maintain a bankruptcy
framework that rewards the forum shopping efforts of savvy debtors.'
Relevant aspects of that framework are considered in Part III.B., as is the
important influence of the perceptions engendered through the asset
protective endeavors countenanced under that framework. Finally,
analysis of the federal impetus behind the Self-Settled Paradigm
concludes in Part III.C. with consideration of the direct federal response
to the offshore trust movement, examined by reference to the overriding
tax concerns which motivated that response in derogation of concerns
for the more general asset protection dynamic then developing.
A.

Basic Parametersof the Self-Settled Paradigm

In a clear break from the historically discernable parameters of the
Traditional Paradigm, many jurisdictions now by statute permit a trust
settlor to create, fund, and enjoy the benefits of a trust that is immune
from the claims of the settlor-beneficiary's creditors, at least with
respect to an action controlled by the laws of the relevant state.'12 From a
purely domestic perspective, the Self-Settled Paradigm blossomed in
1997 when the State of Alaska enacted domestically unprecedented
legislation aimed at encouraging the creation of self-settled asset
protection trusts ("APT") in that state." 3 The Alaska legislature pursued
109. See supra Part lI.B.
110. This is consistent with the earlier introduction of the Traditional Paradigm. See supra
Part H.A.
11l.See infra notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
112. With respect to conflicts of law issues in the context of self-settled asset protection trusts,
see, for example, Sterk, supra note 9, at 1081-89; John K. Eason, Home From the Islands: Domestic
Asset Protection Trust Alternatives Impact Traditional Estate and Gift Tax Planning
Considerations,52 FLA. L. REV. 41, 69-72 (2000). See also infra note 142 and accompanying text.
113. ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (Michie 2000). Pertinent legislation in Missouri should be
examined for its self-settled asset protective features, although such legislation is of debatable legal
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this objective through statutory language that expressly permits a person
to transfer property to an Alaska-sitused trust and to provide in the trust
agreement that the beneficiaries' trust interests-including specifically
the interest of the settlor as beneficiary-may not be voluntarily or
involuntarily alienated.' 41 By statute, such a transfer restriction "prevents
a creditor existing when the trust is created, a person who subsequently
becomes a creditor, or another person from satisfying a claim out of the
beneficiary's interest in the trust .. ,,," The statute makes clear that
protection from creditors will not be lost simply because the settlor
retains "the right to receive a distribution of income, corpus, or both in
the discretion of a person, including a trustee, other than the settlor
.... ,, Not to be outdone, Delaware, Nevada, and then Rhode Island
quickly followed suit in adopting their own domestic APT legislation,
bearing substantial similarities to the Alaska model in both form and
substance.' 7 This competition among states for trust business has been
equated with the similar competition among states for corporate charters,
being thusly described as posing a "race to the bottom" scenario like that

and practical impact in the context of the Self-Settled Paradigm, particularly in light of the domestic
asset protection trust movement so clearly initiated by Alaska's 1997 adoption of comprehensive
asset protection trust legislation. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.080 (1992) (providing what appears to
he limited asset protection for self-settled spendthrift trusts, dating back to 1983). For an equally
equivocal assessment of the Missouri statute, see Boxx, supra note 5, at 1203 n.30 ("Missouri may
also recognize self-settled trusts as enforceable to some degree.").
114. The term "situs" generally refers to the place at which a thing-in this case, a trust-is
deemed to be located for legal purposes. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1392 (7th ed. 1999).
However, the choice of law issues can become quite complex where self-settled spendthrift trust
protections are at issue and multiple jurisdictions have contact with the parties, the trust, or the
transactions giving rise to the dispute. See infra note 142.
115. ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(b). However, such asset protection will not be available if the
settlor retains the power to revoke or terminate all or a portion of the trust without the consent of a
person possessing "a substantial beneficial interest in the trust [which] ... would be adversely
affected by the exercise of Isuch] power." Id. § 34.40.1 10(b)(2).
116. Id. §34.40.1 10(b)(2). The statute is less than artfully drafted in allowing the settlor to be a
creditor-protected beneficiary, doing so by implication in defining a power to revoke or terminate as
not including "a power to veto a distribution from the trust, a testamentary special power of
appointment or similar power, or the right to receive a distribution of income, corpus, or both in the
discretion of a person, including a trustee, other than the settlor." Id.
117. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3570-73 (2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 166.040-.060
(Michie 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 18-9.2-1 to 18-9.2-7 (2000). A mirror image of the Alaska
legislation was proposed but not acted upon in the 1999 session of the Texas House. H.B. 1553,
1999 Leg., 76th Sess. (Tex. 1999) (introduced Feb. 17, 1999). It is sometimes said that Missouri and
Colorado might be self-settled asset protection trust jurisdictions, but this claim is questionable. See
in this regard supra note 113 (discussing Missouri statute); 1 A. JAMES CASNER & JEFFREY N.
PENNELL, ESTATE PLANNING § 4.1.4 n.23 (6th ed. 2000 Supp.) (discussing COLO. REV. STAT. § 3810-111 (1997)).
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described in the corporate context
by William Cary in his well-known
' 8
1974 Yale Law Journalarticle.
Although a detailed examination of the mechanics by which these
statutes purport to offer asset protection and their potential weaknesses is
beyond the scope of this Article and unnecessary to its thesis, this
domestic movement's origins in the laws of certain non-U.S. or
"offshore" jurisdictions must be stated. Directly revealing are the
legislative histories of the Alaska and Delaware legislation, which
expressly cite the offshore APT environment as inspiring these domestic
counterparts." 9 The legislative history behind Delaware's trust
legislation, for example, explicitly notes that "[t]hese new [statutory]
features should make Delaware a more attractive jurisdiction for
establishing trusts that are protected, under certain defined conditions,
from claims of a settlor's creditors" and that certain of those statutory
features were specifically "intended to facilitate the repatriation of
existing offshore trusts to Delaware."' 2 Accordingly, there can be little
doubt that this domestic current to embrace the Self-Settled Paradigm
found inspiration in the offshore trust arena. But have federal policies
and actions played a role in this evolution, either domestically or with
regard to the underlying offshore movement? The answer is most
definitely yes. That influence and the mechanisms by which it has been
exerted are less than obvious, however. It is towards this modern federal
influence upon the course of trust asset protection that the focus of this
Article now turns.
B. Asset Protection:The Bankruptcy Foundationand its Attendant
Perceptions
Understanding the movements in trust asset protection requires an
appreciation of principles of taxation, bankruptcy, economics, and the

118. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663 (1974), as discussed in the context of a potential "race to the bottom" in the trust law
setting in Sterk, supra note 8, at 1038.
119. See H.B. 747, 139th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (Del. 1997), reprinted in 71 DEL. LAWS 343
(1998); H.B. 101, 20th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Alaska 1997).
120. H.B. No. 747, 139th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (Del. 1997), reprinted in 71 DEL. LAWS 343
(1998). The history of the Alaska statutory changes reveals similar motivations. See H.B. 101, 20th
Leg. Reg. Sess. (Alaska 1997) (statement of Rep. Al Veezy) (stating that Alaska has the opportunity
to establish itself as a major financial market for the U.S. and even the world.); see also Opposing
PartiesJoin Forces to Attract Family Trust Industry to Alaska, ALASKA J. COM., Apr. 14, 1997, at 6
(describing the new trust legislation as being "aimed at luring a multi-billion dollar industry to
Alaska ... [and] intended to make the state a national and international center for administering
trusts."); ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.043 (Michie 2000) (permitting change of situs of trust to Alaska).
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role of perceptions in shaping both the development of and responses to
that movement. A starting point is to consider certain specifics of the
federal bankruptcy framework, and in particular the formalities by which
a trust designed with asset protection in mind might retain such
protected status notwithstanding the trust beneficiary's inability to pay
her debts.' 2' This rubric and all of its attendant subtleties have immense
significance in the continued asset protective viability of the Traditional
and Self-Settled paradigms.
Of critical importance to this bankruptcy framework is the scheme
by which certain property of a bankrupt debtor might be removed from
the pool of assets from which creditor claims are satisfied.'22 Beginning
121. See, e.g., In re Moses, 167 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1999).
122. A debtor-creditor action may be thrust into the federal bankruptcy forum at the request of
the debtor or, if certain conditions are satisfied, at the request of the debtor's creditors. However, a
Chapter 13 proceeding (discussed below) can only be initiated by the debtor. See II U.S.C. § 303
(2001) (initiation of involuntary proceedings upon filing petition under 1978 Code Chapter 7); Id.
§ 301 (initiation of voluntary proceeding upon filing petition under any Chapter). More generally,
where a trust beneficiary is unable to pay debts, the beneficiary's creditors might force that debtor
into a federal bankruptcy proceeding in an effort to marshal as much property of the debtor as
possible for an orderly payment of debts, or alternatively, an insolvent debtor might herself choose
voluntarily to proceed under federal bankruptcy legislation in order to avail herself of some of the
protections afforded thereunder. Two particular debtor advantages of proceeding under the federal
bankruptcy rubric are: (1) the automatic stay, which generally halts all collection efforts and
proceedings outside the bankruptcy forum; and (2) the discharge, which generally serves as a
release of the debtor (and the debtor's exempt or excluded assets) from liability on all but a handful
of specified debts which arose prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. See id. § 362 (automatic
stay); Id. § 727 (discharge in Chapter 7 proceeding); Id. § 1328 (discharge in Chapter 13
proceeding). The advantages to creditors center upon the broad powers of the bankruptcy court to
effect a marshalling of the debtor's assets for payment of claims, coupled with a process for orderly
administration and satisfaction of those claims. See, e.g., id. § 507 (establishing priorities for
payment of claims); Id. § 541(a) (providing for broad inclusion of a debtor's assets in the
bankruptcy estate). If neither the debtor nor any creditors initiate a federal bankruptcy proceeding,
the resolution of matters pertaining to satisfaction of the debtor's obligations may be handled as a
matter of state law. Given the relevance and preemptive effect of federal bankruptcy laws in this
setting, this Article focuses on the federal bankruptcy proceeding as the forum of primary relevance
for pursuit of the types of creditor claims which implicate the paradigms discussed here. Indeed, a
similar posture was taken by the commentators in a recent roundtable discussion addressing the
current asset protection trust environment. See Symposium, Roundtable Discussion, 32 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 779, 785 (1999) [hereinafter Roundtable Discussion] (discussing asset protection
trusts and noting that "bankruptcy courts are really going to be the battle ground on these things").
A proceeding under Chapter 7 of the 1978 Code typically involves a debtor lacking the
means to repay creditors. A Chapter 7 proceeding is often referred to as a liquidation proceeding,
because all of the debtor's nonexempt or nonexcluded property is essentially liquidated and applied
to payment of creditor claims. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b) (providing rules of eligibility for Chapter 7
filing); Id. § 726 (providing for distribution of property of bankruptcy estate in payment of creditor
claims). Thus, under a Chapter 7 plan, the debtor's assets are collected by the bankruptcy trustee
and liquidated or distributed, with the proceeds distributed to creditors under the oversight of the
bankruptcy court. Generally speaking, the debtor thereafter emerges from the proceeding freed from
liability for debts which arose prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. See id. § 727 (addressing
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more generally, competitive with the fresh start goal of the federal
bankruptcy system is a second goal-to marshal debtor assets for use in
satisfying creditor claims.'23 Consequently, when resolution of a debtor's
obligations are subjected to a federal bankruptcy proceeding upon the
filing of a bankruptcy petition, a broadly-conceived pool of debtor
assets-denominated the "bankruptcy estate"-is identified and then
administered under the supervision of the bankruptcy court in
furtherance of the payment of creditor claims.'24 However, property
excepted or removed from this bankruptcy estate is generally preserved
for the debtor's benefit, notwithstanding the debtor's obligations to
creditors. ' The Bankruptcy Code of 1978 ("1978 Code")'26 provides for
two basic mechanisms by virtue of which such preservation might be
achieved. The first is that of excluding property from the bankruptcy
estate from the outset. 7 The second more broadly applicable mechanism
is that of exempting certain property, otherwise included in the
bankruptcy estate, from the claims of creditors.' Because the exemption
issue only arises if property is determined in the first instance to be part
discharge from debts). For individual debtors, the second most likely scenario would have the
matter resolved under Chapter 13 of the 1978 Code, whereby a plan is formulated pursuant to which
the debtor might pay off creditors over time. A proceeding under Chapter 13 is available only to
debtors having a regular income and owing debts below specified dollar amounts. See id. § 109(e)
(providing rules of eligibility for Chapter 13 filing). A Chapter 13 proceeding entails a plan of
repayment, after completion of which the discharge may be granted. See id. § 1322 (calling for plan
of repayment not to span more than three years absent cause and court approval). See generally H.R.
REP. No. 95-595, at 118-26 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6079-6087 (discussing
operation of Chapters 13 and 7).
123. The fresh start objective is discussed in the text accompanying supra notes 96-99.
Regarding the juxtaposition of these goals, see H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 126 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6087.
124. See II U.S.C. § 541(a); see, e.g., In re Moses, 167 F.3d at 473 ("The act of filing a
petition under the Bankruptcy Code commences bankruptcy proceedings and creates an estate
comprised of [all of the debtor's property].").
125. See Ii U.S.C. § 541(c).
126. The 1978 Code is codified in Title II of the United States Code. The first comprehensive
and long-lived bankruptcy legislation in this country was the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. See supra
notes 43-45. Although subject to important amendments along the way, that Act defined the
bankruptcy landscape until it was replaced by the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, which remains in
effect today.
127. Excluded property remains beyond the purview of the bankruptcy court and its power to
marshal assets in furtherance of creditor satisfaction. See Wohl, supra note 103, at 6 n.18; Brown,
supra note 98, at 178 (discussing bankruptcy estate inclusion as bringing the debtor's property
within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts, while exemptions thereafter essentially subject
property within that jurisdiction to the substantive laws of the various states).
128. The exemption provisions are set forth in II U.S.C. § 522, and are discussed in depth in
Part III.B.2. The focus shifted from that of exclusions under the 1898 Act to an emphasis upon
exemptions under the 1978 Code, although much of the same reasoning applied in both instances.
See Wohl, supra note 103, at 6 n. 18, 11 n.48.
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of the bankruptcy estate,129 the exclusion issue is considered first,
followed by consideration of the exemption issue. 30 While statutory
rules frame this examination, true insight is found in the more subtle
implications of the policy choices that underlie the federal bankruptcy
scheme.
1. Exclusion of Certain Trust Interests
Section 541(a) of the 1978 Code provides that property of the
bankruptcy estate consists of "all legal or equitable interest of the debtor
in property as of commencement of the [bankruptcy proceeding]."' 3'
Although federalism principles often implicate reference to state law in
deciding if a debtor has a legal or equitable interest in a given item, the
determination of whether or not such interest then becomes property of
the bankruptcy estate is a matter of federal law. 32 Accordingly,
restrictions that purport to limit the transferability of a property interest
are specifically nullified under 1978 Code section 541(c)(1) such that the
allegedly restricted interest nevertheless comes into the bankruptcy
estate. ' In isolation, therefore, this seemingly all-encompassing pool of
assets from which creditor claims might be satisfied appears to include
an equitable trust interest such as that enjoyed by a spendthrift trust
beneficiary.'34
However, the 1978 Code respects such transfer restrictions in one
instance by providing for a single exclusion of such restricted property
from the bankruptcy estate. That exclusion is found in 1978 Code
section 541(c)(2), which provides that "[a] restriction on the transfer of a
beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under
applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under [the 1978
Code].' 35 In other words, if a bankrupt debtor is the beneficiary of a

129. See In re Moses, 167 F.3d at 474.
130. See, e.g., id. ("[Elxemption issues only arise if the court concludes that the [property at
issue] is part of the bankruptcy estate. In other words, . . . an 'exemption' statute ... does not
[alffect [property that] ... is not part of the bankruptcy estate" by virtue of the operation of II
U.S.C. § 541(c)(2)).
131. 11 U.S.C.§541(a).
132. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 367-68 (1977); S. REP. No. 95-989, at 82-83 (1978), as
discussed in 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY $ 541.LH(3)(a) (Alan N. Resnick et al., eds., 15th ed.
2002) [hereinafter COLLIER]. For a more current example of the federalism issue in operation, see
infra note 204.
133. See II U.S.C.§541(c)(1).
134. See id.
135. Id. § 541(c)(2). This provision of the 1978 Code is hereinafter referred to as
"§ 541(c)(2)." In contrast to the deference accorded spendthrift restrictions, restrictions on the
transfer of interests the debtor may have in other nontrust property are not recognized, and such
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trust, the terms of which include an enforceable restriction on transfer
such as that typically associated with a spendthrift restraint, both the
trust property and the debtor's equitable interest in the trust property are
excluded from the debtor's bankruptcy estate.136 The trust property and
the debtor's trust interest therefore remain beyond the reach of
creditors. 37 This result with respect to trusts is consistent with the
treatment of such interests under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 ("1898
Act"),3' and is attributable more to federal deference to state law than to
either constitutional mandate or any overriding fairness concern
implicating such treatment.39
Three points should be noted with respect to the section 541(c)(2)
exclusion of property from the pool of assets from which creditor claims
might be satisfied. First, virtually every state recognizes to some degree
the traditional third-party beneficiary spendthrift trust that lies at the

other property will be immunized from creditor claims only if that particular type of property is
described in an applicable exemption provision. See id. § 541(c)(1).
136. See, e.g., In re Wilcox, 233 F.3d 899, 904 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom. Taunt v.
General Retirement Sys. 533 U.S. 929 (2001) ("An inquiry under § 541(c)(2) normally has 3 parts:
First, does the debtor have a beneficial interest in a trust? Second, is there a restriction on the
transfer of that interest? Third, is the restriction enforceable under nonbankruptcy law?"). Similar
though perhaps not universal reasoning has been applied with respect to discretionary trust interests.
Compare In re Blackwell, 142 B.R. 301, 303 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992) ("Thus, until that
[discretionary distributioni decision is made, the pension trust is tantamount to a spendthrift trust
such that the property would be excluded from the bankruptcy estate."), with DRAFT RESTATEMENT,
supra note 6, § 60, reporter's note to cmts. b, c (concluding that discretionary trust interest would be
property of bankruptcy estate, but then floundering somewhat as to the practical significance of this
conclusion, which is acknowledged to "raise other troublesome issues").
137. This protection is ultimately attributable to the interaction of 1978 Code § 541(c)(2) and
the bankruptcy discharge discussed supra note 122.
138. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 70(a)(5) (1899) (formerly codified at II U.S.C. § 110); see
also supra note 43. Under that provision, the excludability of a property interest turned upon its
transferability or leviability under state law, considered in light of the dual fresh start versus
marshalling of assets objectives of the bankruptcy laws. This approach generally resulted in the
exclusion of both spendthrift and other types of protected trusts from the bankruptcy estate, whereas
the current act truly "excludes" only the spendthrift trust. See In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574, 578-80 &
n.19 (5th Cir. 1983), overruled by Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992) (discussing
spendthrift trust treatment under current § 541 (c)(2) and its predecessor under the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898); William J. Woodward, Jr., Exemptions, Opting Out, and Bankruptcy Reform, 43 OHIO ST.
L.J. 335, 347 (1982) (discussing "property of the estate" under the 1898 Act).
139. See supra note 138; see also DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 58, reporter's note to
cmt. a (noting that 11 U.S.C. § 541 (c)(2) "continues a long tradition of giving effect to this
particular restriction"). However, the spendthrift trust exception to rejecting such restrictions stands
out relative to the broad marshalling of assets concept embodied in the expansive II U.S.C.
§ 541(a). In fact, it has been noted that the general rejection of paying heed to such restrictions
"emphasizes the increased independence of the [1978] Code from nonbankruptcy law concerning
[what debtor interests constitute] property of the estate." 5 COLLIER, supra note 132, 541.24.
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heart of the Traditional Paradigm.'40 Consequently, where such a trust is
at issue, section 541(c)(2) will generally operate to preserve the trust
assets for utilization in satisfaction of the debtor-beneficiary's protected4
trust interest going forward, notwithstanding creditor claims.' '
Similarly, a self-settled spendthrift trust created under one of the new
domestic statutes or comparable offshore laws will likely be excluded
from the bankruptcy estate under section 541(c)(2), so long as the
bankruptcy court applies the laws of the APT jurisdiction
by reference to
4
which such provision might be deemed enforceable. 1

140. With regard to variations in state law recognition of spendthrift trust restraints, see infra
note 143.
141. In this regard, it may be generally observed that other forms of the creditor-protected trust
which might comprise a trust fitting within the Traditional Paradigm would arguably be likewise
excluded, at least in practical result, so long as the protective aspect would be recognized under
applicable state law. See supra note 136 and accompanying text regarding the similarity in
treatment often accorded such other trust forms. With respect to the application of jurisdictional law
by virtue of which protection is offered, see infra note 142 and accompanying text.
142. The court's doing so is by no means a foregone conclusion, particularly when the parties
or transactions at issue seem more closely related to a non-asset protection trust ("APT")
jurisdiction that deems self-settled protection from creditors violative of its public policy. More
specifically, a trust settlor is typically regarded as having the power to designate in the trust
instrument the state law which is to govem the trust. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 17,
§§ 301, 330. If the law of an APT jurisdiction is designated by the settlor and thereafter respected
and applied by a court hearing a creditor dispute, the spendthrift and other trust protections should
generally be effective in preserving the trust assets from claims of the settlor's creditors. However,
it is also generally accepted that a choice of law provision may be ignored where the laws of the
expressly chosen jurisdiction offend the public policy of the forum state in which a legal action
concerning the trust is brought. See 17 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 124.32(4) (3d ed. 1999) (noting that choice of law provisions will not be given effect where
"[aipplication of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state...
that has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular
issue"). Thus, if an action is brought against a settlor-beneficiary in a non-APT forum which has
jurisdiction over the settlor, that non-APT forum may find the self-settled APT a violation of its
public policy, and, therefore, the forum court may apply the laws of the state in which it sits and
refuse to recognize the trust as a valid protection against the claims of the settlor's creditors. See
generally BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 17, §§ 291, 301; 5A SCOTr & FRATCHER, supra note 11,
§ 573. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 270 (1971) (addressing the validity of a
trust generally, where the applicability of the laws of multiple jurisdictions is at issue); id. § 273
(addressing the more specific question of whether a spendthrift provision restraining a beneficiary's
ability to alienate an interest in the trust property will be given effect). Determining the law that
governed the effectiveness of self-settled APT was a pivotal issue in In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. 685
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996), and In re Brooks, 217 B.R. 98 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998), although the
bankruptcy courts there opted not to apply the laws of the APT jurisdiction where the trusts were
sitused, thus rendering the spendthrift provisions unenforceable and outside the protection afforded
under 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (2000). In addition to these uncertainties where the Self-Settled
Paradigm is at issue, the exact role played by II U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) under the Federal Retirement
Paradigm has been a matter of some contention over the last few decades, as discussed supra note
103.
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Second, there are exceptions to this exclusion outcome, most
notably where the nonbankruptcy trust laws upon which the bankruptcy
court bases its inclusion/exclusion determination provide that a
spendthrift clause will to some extent not be enforced. For example,
while asset protection under the Traditional Paradigm is available in
some form in almost every state, several states permit that creditor
barrier to be breached at some dollar or percentage level of trust assets,
at some percentage of trust distributions, or where the creditor is of a
particular class. 143 Typical are the new Uniform Trust Code ("UTC") and
Draft Restatement (Third) of Trusts, both of which reaffirm the prior law
vulnerability of a spendthrift trust interest where the claimant is a
dependent spouse or child, a creditor who has provided services that
helped to protect the beneficiary's trust interest, or a government
claimant where federal or other law expressly so allows.144 Such
exceptions are grounded in the longstanding notion that in some
circumstances public policy considerations should override the settlor's
freedom to dispose of property to the exclusion of creditors.'45 As a
143. In some instances the referenced limitations are imposed by the state legislature, and in
other instances by judicial decision. See, e.g., SCoTT & FRATCHER, supra note 11, § 152.1 (listing
jurisdictions which impose limitations upon the recognition of spendthrift trust protection); see id.
§ 157 (listing jurisdictions recognizing exceptions to spendthrift trust protections based on class of
claimant); Boxx, supra note 5, at 1202 & n.28 (discussing various state limitations); see also Oshins
& Riser, supra note 94, at 14 (noting distinction between a court's power to limit spendthrift
protection where protection is founded upon judicial precedent versus statutory recognition). A
state-by-state survey of spendthrift trust law is beyond the scope of this Article and is generally
unnecessary in light of the survey provided in the foregoing treatises, with annual supplementation.
For examples of statutory limitations on spendthrift trust protections, see VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19
(Michie 1995) (protecting trust principal up to $500,000 per beneficiary); CAL. PROB. CODE
§§ 15300, 15306.5, 15307 (West 2000) (providing that trust distributions are reachable to extent in
excess of the amount reasonably necessary for beneficiary's support and education, up to twentyfive percent of the total distributions).
144. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503 (2000); DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 59. For prior
law, see I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157 (1959). Creditors entitled to reach the interest
notwithstanding spendthrift protection have typically been limited to these groups. See generally id.
(listing exceptions from enforceability of spendthrift protections). Comment "a" to that section
alludes to the "possibility" that tort creditors might be similarly excepted, although to date this idea
has not been widely embraced and was excluded from the specified exceptions in the body of
section 157 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts due to the absence of any judicial precedent to
such effect. See also supra note 94.
145. See DRAFI" RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 59, reporter's note to cmt. b (discussing similar
exemptions with regard to pension plans under 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (1995), ERISA § 206(d)(3)
(1994), and the exception from bankruptcy discharge of such debts as provided in II U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(5)). Referenced support for such exceptions was found in federal laws that similarly
elevate spouses and children over asset protections otherwise afforded under federal law. See, e.g.,
id. § 59, reporter's note to cmt. a. Interestingly, however, the drafters of the UTC departed from the
position adopted in both the Second and Draft Restatements of Trust by excluding providers of
necessaries from the class of excepted creditors. Compare id. § 59, with UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503
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result, there are clearly some limited circumstances where a spendthrift
provision is not fully "enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law"
within the section 541(c)(2) exclusionary language, and therefore the
provision will not serve to fully protect the trust interest from creditor
claims. 46 Notwithstanding that caveat, however, the scope of policybased limitations upon spendthrift protections has generally been
restricted in actual practice at the state level.147 As a consequence, the
ongoing interaction between section 541(c)(2) and state trust law
continues to provide an expansive path to asset protection.
The final point to note with respect to the operation of
section 541(c)(2) entails what is best characterized as an opportune
federal occasion to significantly reshape the parameters of trust asset
protection through federal bankruptcy laws. Had such reshaping
occurred, the trust paradigms would have been fundamentally altered in
operative effect and relative to objections that might be levied against
the protection so afforded. More specifically, Congress created a special
Commission in 1970 to assist with the impending bankruptcy reform
that would ultimately culminate in the enactment of the 1978 Code. 48 As
part of its 1973 report, that Commission recommended to Congress that
the spendthrift trust bankruptcy exclusion (now embodied in
section 541(c)(2)) be limited so as to protect only that amount of trust
property or interest necessary to provide for the reasonable support
needs of the beneficiary and her dependents.' 49 Any excess above the
(2000). The apparent belief was that the exception most often inured to the benefit of government
claimants seeking reimbursement for medical expenses paid on behalf of the trust beneficiary
through Medicaid, and that any such exception to the protected nature of the beneficiary's trust
interest in this regard was a more proper subject for specific legislation targeted to address that
concern. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503 cmt. Apparently, as a matter of pure creditor-protected trust
doctrine, the settlor's desire to enhance the quality of her trust beneficiary's life trumps the public
interest in alleviating the burden to society at large for such expenses as paid under the taxpayerfunded Medicaid program, absent legislated judgment otherwise. See Young, supra note 7, at 109
("There may be a policy argument in favor of this [exception to asset protection] in terms of
relieving other taxpayers of the Medicaid burden, but it is probably far from the wishes of most
third-party settlors.").
146. See II U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (2000).
147. See, for example, the discussion supra note 94 of excepting tort creditors from the class of
persons precluded from realizing on a judgment out of the tortfeasor's interest in a spendthrift trust.
148. The 1973 commission was established under Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (effective
July 24, 1970). The Commission's 1973 final report, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1 (1973), is reprinted in COLLIER, supra note 132, vol. B app., Part 4-C [hereinafter 1973
Commission Report]. The 1973 Commission's Report is discussed extensively in In re Goff, 706
F.2d 574, 581 n. 19 (5th Cir. 1983), overruled by Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992).
149. This recommendation is embodied in Section 4-601(b) of the Commission's proposed
statute included in the 1973 Commission Report, supra note 148, which was a focal point of debate
concerning the impending new bankruptcy legislation. With respect to the exclusion of spendthrift
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amount necessary to satisfy this objective would be subject to possession
or disposition by the bankruptcy trustee in satisfaction of creditor
claims.'50 In so recommending, the Commission expressly opined that:
There is no sound justification for permitting a debtor to take
advantage of [federal bankruptcy laws] and, at the same time, to shield
from his creditors assets because local law does not allow creditors to
reach his interest. The Commission generally recommends that these
[spendthrift] restraints not be enforceable. However, in recognition of
the possibility that the spendthrift trust may be used to protect one
incapable of providing for his own welfare, the debtor should be
allowed to retain sufficient income to support himself and his
dependents. But to the extent the beneficial interest is of a value in
excess of the reasonable support needs of the debtor and his
dependents, the interest should be available to the debtor's creditors. 5'
The Commission's opinion was embraced by the Senate and the
limitation was included in the Senate-passed version of the new
bankruptcy legislation. 5 2 This momentum was not novel, as similar
views had been expressed in the commentary relating to the Traditional
Paradigm and were also then reflected in the laws of a handful of
states. 51 3 Note that the point is not that the Senate was embracing a
heretofore rejected theory, as was more the case with the Supreme Court
decision in Nichols v. Eaton. 54 Rather, the point is that Congress was
directly confronted with and specifically considered imposing a

trust property under the prior 1898 Act, see supra note 138 and infra notes 172-87 and
accompanying text.
150. The notes to the Commission's proposed Section 4-601 as set forth in the 1973
Commission Report, supra note 148, state that
"[i]f the income exceeds such amount [as may be necessary to support the debtor and the
debtor's dependents], the [bankruptcy] trustee can sell the right to the excess income,
hold open the case so as to collect the income, or reach the principal to the extent in
excess of the principal needed to generate the support income ... subject, of course, to
the rights of any third persons in the principal."
With regard to collecting against a trust beneficiary's equitable trust interest, see supra note 62.
151. 1973 Commission Report, supra note 148, at 197-98.
152. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 83 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5869.
153. For commentary on this point, see GRISWOLD, supra note 37, § 565 (imposing a limitation
in the model statute by means of a dollar cap on the amount of income interest that would be
protected); Wohl, supra note 103, at 17 n.79; ScoT-r & FRATCHER, supra note 11, § 152. With
regard to variations in state laws, see supra note 143.
154. For the discussion of the federal impact the Nichols decision had upon the Traditional
Paradigm, see supra Part II.
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nationally-uniform limitation of substantial asset protection consequence
upon trust interests otherwise sheltered under state law.'55
Interestingly, this "reasonable support needs" standard before
Congress in the mid-1970s mirrored the limiting inquiry deemed by
some commentators to have been foreclosed by the pervasive influence
of the freedom of disposition argument emphasized in Nichols almost a
century earlier.'5 6 On point is one commentator's succinct evaluation of
Nichols and its progeny: "[h]ad the need of the beneficiaries for
protection been emphasized [in early spendthrift trust analysis], it would
easily have been made to appear that often only a reasonable amount of
income should be freed from the claims of the creditors.', 5 7 Similarly,

had Congress chosen to embrace the Senate limitation in the 1978 Code,
the trust paradigms and the analysis of the proper bounds of asset
protection thereby afforded would have almost certainly inspired a
fundamentally different asset protection trust landscape going forward
through the present day. In lieu of the unlimited amounts that may now
be sheltered from creditors by reference to most state spendthrift trust
laws, a section 541(c)(2) so limited would have given creditors direct
access to spendthrift trust funds in excess of those reasonably necessary
to provide for the debtor-beneficiary's support.'58 Since bankruptcy is the
forum in which the truly decisive battles over such trust interests and
assets are waged,' 9 for all practical purposes trust settlors could only
spendthrift for their beneficiaries an amount of property corresponding6
6
to the support needs of those beneficiaries.' 0 Gray's "privileged class"'
would have been transformed into a genus of some privilege, to be sure,
but one perhaps a bit more attuned to the mantra "attention K-Mart
shoppers."

155. Unlike the Commission's recommendation to limit the § 541(c)(2) exclusion and the
Senate's embracement of that recommendation, it has never been seriously considered that the
Bankruptcy Code would not include some provision recognizing the traditional spendthrift trust, and
therefore the mere existence of section 541 (c)(2) as a federal influence upon the paradigm does not
warrant further discussion.
156. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
157. Costigan, supra note 15, at 483.
158. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1) (2001).
159. This is because of the expansive nature of the bankruptcy estate as affected by the federal
bankruptcy courts' broad powers to marshal debtor assets. See Roundtable Discussion, supra note
122, at 785 (discussing asset protection trusts and noting that "bankruptcy courts are really going to
be the battle ground on these things"). With regard to how a debtor-creditor action might come to be
governed by federal bankruptcy laws, see supra note 122.
160. See RoundtableDiscussion, supra note 122, at 828.
161. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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Alas, although adopted wholesale by the Senate, the Commission's
recommendation was not reflected in the House version of the new
bankruptcy legislation that ultimately became law.1 2 The legislative
history of the completed 1978 Code. contains no meaningful discussion
of the issue,16 so it is left to speculation as to whether this omission was
ultimately the result of considered rejection of the Commission's
opinion or simple compromise attributable to political expediency which
cast in an unfavorable light the task of reconciling the difficult
federalism and other policy choices implicated in the competing House
and Senate versions of the pending legislation. What is clear, however, is
that (1) the paradigms were threatened by the prospect of fundamental
limitation, (2) the issue was ripe for federal consideration upon having
been placed squarely before Congress as part of major new bankruptcy
legislation, (3) the opportunity was ultimately passed over without
explanation, and thus, (4) the asset protection afforded by virtue of
spendthrifted trust interests was ultimately permitted to continue its
evolution
within the
wide-open
bounds
permitted under
section 541(c)(2).' 64 The federal influence wrought by rejecting an
invitation to considerably narrow the parameters of the asset protection
offered under the paradigms is important. It is, at the very least, an event
of federal shaping of the paradigms through considered omission. That
omission lies in Congress contemplating, but ultimately abstaining from,
imposing any purposive limitations upon the federal avenues pursuant to
which spendthrift trust asset protection maintains its viability.'6 5 This
congressional passivity becomes a bit more aggressive, however, when
attention is paid to the attitudes clearly fostered under the chosen
bankruptcy exemption scheme, as explored next.
2. Fostering Perceptions Through the Exemption Opt-Out
Turning now to the second avenue by which property might be
sheltered from creditor claims in a federal bankruptcy proceeding, a
brief examination of the approach to exemptions under federal
bankruptcy law reveals a history of considerable deference to federalism
concerns. That deference is manifest in consistent rejection of calls for
162. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 367-69 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 63236325; see also 124 CONG. REC. HI 1,096 at 32395 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep.
Edwards).
163. See generally 124 CONG. REC. HI 1,096 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978); 124 CONG. REC
S17,413 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini).
164. See II U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (2000). See generally H.R. REP. No. 95-595; 124 CONG. REC.
H 11,096 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978); 124 CONG. REC. S17,413 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
165. See supra note 163.
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the uniform delineation of property that may be exempted in a federal
bankruptcy proceeding.' 6' Analysis consistently suggests that uniformity
would eliminate instances of manipulative conduct that are so critical in
cultivating perceptions that unfairness and lax boundaries abound in the
pursuit of liability avoidance. 67 These perceptions have inspired the
Self-Settled Paradigm. Unlike the general appeal to the bare existence of
exemption laws in Nichols, however, the reference here is more pointed
in its contemplation of the particular "opt-out" exemption scheme
embraced by Congress. 16
Specifically, once property is included in the bankruptcy estate, it
may nevertheless escape the reach of creditors by virtue of certain
1 69
exemptions provided for under section 522(b) of the 1978 Code.
Section 522(b)(1) provides that a debtor may exempt the property
described on a list of federal exemptions set forth in section 522(d) of
the 1978 Code, "unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor...
specifically does not so authorize .... 170 The laws of approximately
thirty-five states specifically do not so authorize-in other words, those
states have "opted out" of the federal exemption list in accordance with
the foregoing federal statutory language. 7 ' A debtor residing in one of
those "opt-out states" is limited under section 522(b)(2) to the
exemptions provided for under that state's laws, plus a handful
of
72
exemptions called for under federal laws other than the 1978 Code.
166. Although the United States Constitution article I, § 8, clause 4, confers upon Congress the
power to promulgate "uniform laws concerning bankruptcy," the Supreme Court has concluded that
the Constitution permits (but does not require) deference to state laws, despite the result that a
debtor in one state might receive different treatment in bankruptcy than a debtor residing in a
different state. See Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 187-88 (1902). Instead, all that is
required is "geographical uniformity," which will be deemed to exist where: "(i) the substantive law
applied in a bankruptcy case conforms to that applied outside of bankruptcy under state law; (ii) the
same law is applied to all debtors within a state and to their creditors; and (iii) Congress uniformly
delegates to the states the power to fix those laws." Tabb, supra note 43, at 47; see also 1997 FINAL
REPORT, supra note 43, at 118-19 (discussing Hanover and noting that "geographical uniformity did
not change the fact that creditors of financially identical debtors would receive very different
distributions in bankruptcy depending on where those debtors happened to live").
167. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 191.
168. See id.
169. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2000); see S. REP. No. 95-989, at 82 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5868. Section 522(b) of the 1978 Code is hereinafter referred to as "§ 522(b)."
170. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1).
171. See 5 COLLIER, supra note 132, 522.01.
172. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2). In the limited number of states that have not opted-out, debtors
may choose either the federal exemptions referenced under § 522(b)(1) and set forth in § 522(d), or
the state and nonbankruptcy federal law exemptions described in § 522(b)(2). This further dilutes
the impact of the federal exemption scheme under the 1978 Code. See generally 5 COLLIER, supra
note 132, 522.02(l). For a list of the "opt-out" states, see id. 522.01 n.2. See also NAT'L BANKR.
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3. Exemption Planning
This scheme fosters a longstanding and prevalent asset protection
technique in the bankruptcy arena that is often referred to as "exemption
planning."' 7' The general objective of exemption planning is to convert
property that would otherwise be subject to creditor claims by virtue of
its inclusion in the bankruptcy estate and the inapplicability of any
exemption, into property that qualifies for an exemption under the
relevant bankruptcy rules.174 Under the opt-out scheme, such planning
often entails the debtor's relocating to a state that offers more generous
exemption laws, thereby expanding the nature and extent of property
that may be shielded from creditor claims. 75 There is a clear crossinfluence between the availability of this type of planning in the
bankruptcy context with similar planning in the trust field.176 For
example, consider one recent commentator's juxtaposition of this idea in
noting that "[i]t is not at all clear why [bankruptcy] exemption planning
should be regarded differently than other legitimate forms of estate
299-301 (1997) (setting
forth state-by-state designation of homestead exemption and opt-out status in table form). Federal
nonbankruptcy laws provide exemptions for social security benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 407, and other
federal benefits such as those paid in retirement to civil servants, 5 U.S.C. § 8346 (2000). See 5
COLLIER, supra note 132, $ 522.02(3); In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983). For a discussion of
the operation of these federal exemptions under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, see generally Vern
Countryman, For a New Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 678, 738-40 (1960).
173. See Lawrence Ponoroff, Exemption Limitations: A Tale of Two Solutions, 71 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 221, 227-33 (1997).
174. See generally id. ("'Exemption planning' ... entails the deliberate effort on the part of a
financially beleaguered debtor to liquidate assets that are not exempt from the claims of general
creditors and then use the proceeds.., to purchase, make improvements upon, or pay down existing
encumbrances on assets that are exempt .... "). Exemption planning is also sometimes denominated
"bankruptcy estate planning." See, e.g., Cole, supra note 98, at 248-49 ("Bankruptcy estate planning
consists of the sheltering of assets through the conversion of nonexempt property in the state of
origin to exempt property in the destination state."). The term "prebankruptcy planning" is also
sometimes used to refer more generally to the exercise of seeking to retain for the debtor property
that might otherwise be available for satisfaction of creditor claims in the absence of such planning.
See Brown, supra note 98, at 163-70, 187 (defining "exemption planning" as a more specific
category of "prebankruptcy planning"). Exemption planning is also sometimes referred to as "asset
conversion," denoting the converting of property into a form which falls within the applicable list of
exempt property.
175. See Cole, supra note 98, at 230-31.
What makes jurisdiction jumping both possible and attractive ... is the conjunction of
two facts: states vary dramatically as to the types and extent of property they deem
exempt ... and federal bankruptcy law operates as a procedural device for the orderly
resolution of disputes and claims on a debtor's property, while generally leaving
undisturbed the rights created by state property law .... [This] has created an
environment in which debtors are capable of choosing the regime that provides for the
most advantageous disposition of their property.
176. See Ponoroff, supra note 173, at 234.
REV. COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS, FINAL REPORT
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planning and wealth preservation."'77 Of course, estate planning and
wealth preservation are the traditional realm of the spendthrift trust. '
The homestead exemption in particular evinces the rewards of
forum shopping in the context of exemption planning. Homestead
property generally consists of a debtor's equity in her primary residence
and perhaps some surrounding acreage, although specific definitions
vary widely between states relative to one another and relative to the
federal homestead exemption available where no opt-out occurs.'79 A

matter of particular variation across jurisdictions is the value of
homestead property that may be exempted.'8 ° The dollar values subject to
exemption range from zero to infinity. 8 ' Herein lies the prospect of
forum shopping resulting in significant asset protection advantages.
Specifically, a solvent but troubled debtor residing in a state permitting a
nominal homestead exemption might relocate to a state that provides for
an unlimited homestead exemption. As part of this process, nonexempt
assets might be liquidated or otherwise utilized to purchase equity in the
now protected homestead property. s2 If bankruptcy does ultimately
ensue, it is quite likely that the debtor can emerge from this process

177. Id. at 235.
178. Preserving assets from creditor claims and beneficiary improvidence has long been a
tenant of trust and estate planning for the transfer and ongoing management of wealth. See, e.g.,
Jonathan Blattmachr et al., Trusts and Estates: Alaska's Revision of Its Trust Act, Which Sets Out to
Permit Trusts to Preserve Assets and Reduce Taxes, May Have Implications for Trust Planning
Nationwide, NAT'L L.J., June 6, 1997, at B5 ("Two common goals in estate planning are estate tax
reduction and protection of assets from claims of creditors."); Joseph A. Field, Asset Protection
Planning-A Look at Some of the Drawbacks-The Case Against, in WALTER H. DIAMOND &
DOROTHY B. DIAMOND, I INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS AND ANALYSIS 2001, at INT 201-07
(1999) ("[Tlhis type of [asset protection] planning is really nothing more or less than fine tuning of
'plain vanilla' trust structuring, which practitioners have undertaken for centuries in one form or
another.").
179. Under the federal exemption list, a debtor may exempt "up to $15,000 in value, in real or
personal property that the debtor or dependent of the debtor uses as a residence." 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(d)(1). Recall that the federal homestead exemption is inapplicable to debtors in thirty-four
states and to those debtor's who elect their state law exemptions over the federal exemptions.
180. Five states and the District of Columbia currently place no limit on the amount of
homestead property that may be exempted, while twenty-two states limit the exemption to $15,000
or less. See Letter from Barry Adler, Professor, New York School of Law, et al., to Patrick Leahy,
U.S. Senator, and
F. James
Sensenbrenner,
U.S.
Congressman,
available at
http://www.abiworld.org/research/homeletter52202.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2002) [hereinafter
Professors' Letter]. The states having unlimited homestead exemption are Florida, Iowa, Kansas,
Texas, and South Dakota, whereas Maryland law, for example, has no provision for a homestead
exemption. California, like many states, falls somewhere in between by providing for a homestead
exemption capped at $75,000 in value. For a listing of state homestead exemption amounts and
related treatments, see 1997 FINAL REPORT, supra note 43, Annex D, at 299-301.
181. Seeid.
182. See Professors' Letter, supra note 180, at 2.
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discharged of her pre-bankruptcy obligations, yet still possessed of the
homestead property and the value thereby represented.'83
4. Attention Without Action
There can be little doubt that the prospect of such manipulation has
been the subject of much congressional attention, but again, limited
congressional action. For example, there have been two serious
reconsiderations of the exemption issue by Congressional Commissions
in the last thirty years. The first reconsideration informed the current
1978 Code exemption framework, and the second has informed
legislative activity of more recent origin.1 4 Regarding the first, the
Commission on Bankruptcy Laws recommended in 1973 that a set of
uniform federal exemptions be adopted in lieu of the state exemption
opt-out scheme.'85 The 1973 Commission Report specifically pointed out
that "[a]s a result of the ... deference to ...state law as to exemptions,
...the exemptions available are not the result of reasoned policy but the
happenstance of history and location.' 86 Yet Congress chose in the 1978
Code to continue deferring to state exemption laws through the opt-out
mechanism, notwithstanding such concerns.187
183. See generally Ponoroff, supra note 173, at 288-91 (discussing case law typifying "the
relocation controversy" common to this type of homestead exemption planning). See Cole, supra
note 98, at 230-36 (discussing the problem of "deadbeat jurisdiction jumping" accompanying this
"forum shopping phenomenon").
184. With regard to the establishment of the first Congressional Commission, see the 1973
Commission Report, supra note 148. Concerning the establishment'of the later Congressional
Commission, see the 1997 FINAL REPORT, stpra note 43.
185. See 1973 Commission Report, supra note 148, at II.
186. 1973 Commission Report, supra note 148; COLLIER, supra note 132, app. 4-421. This can
be attributed to the historical deference to state law exemptions and, as to location, because the
exemptions available to a debtor are those granted by the state of the debtor's domicile at or near the
time the bankruptcy proceeding is commenced. With respect to the historical aspect of exemptions,
see generally Woodward, supra note 138, at 336-45 (discussing the history of exemptions in
bankruptcy). As to domicile determining the state to which reference is made for exemption
availability, see II U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (2000) and infra notes 197-99.
187. The reasons are most likely political and historical, as Congress has twice exercised its
constitutional authority to specify exclusively the property that would be exempt in a federal
bankruptcy proceeding. However, the resulting 1800s legislation was short-lived, and in 1898 the
matter of exemptions was expressly deferred to the states excepting only a small number of
exemptions preserved for all debtors under federal law. The constitutional grant of authority with
respect to bankruptcy is found in the United States Constitution article I, § 8, clause 4, discussed
supra note 43. The first two federal bankruptcy acts are discussed supra note 45. See Bankruptcy
Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803; Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5
Stat. 440, repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614; see also 1997 FINAL REPORT, supra
note 43, at 118 (discussing this history). It would be inaccurate to say that the matter of exemptions
was wholly deferred to the states under the 1898 Act, as (with current practice) a few exemptions
were preserved in federal laws that were not part of the 1898 Act. The merits of Congress' choice of
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Returning more pointedly to ideas of fairness and the perceptions
that have helped shape the development of the Self-Settled Paradigm
most specifically at issue in this Part III, the second Congressional
Commission of recent decades to take a comprehensive look at the
federal bankruptcy system issued a telling Final Report in 1997.' Ss That
document presents a current analysis of the ramifications of the 1978
Code's opt-out exemption scheme.'89 The analysis is particularly
insightful when evaluated by reference to the parallel concerns voiced in
objection to the recent rise of the Self-Settled Paradigm and the
exemption/spendthrift trust analogy posited in Nichols.'9 Specifically,
the 1997 Commission concluded that under the opt-out bankruptcy
exemption scheme:
Debtors with roughly equivalent economic profiles and similar
property are receiving vastly dissimilar treatment through the federal
bankruptcy system, and correspondingly their creditors do as well. A
debtor who cannot save a car, a home, and household furniture under
one state's exemption laws may look across the state line to see a
similar debtor saving all of those items and more ....
In deferring to state law exemptions, the current system also
multiplies the opportunities for forum shopping and prebankruptcy
asset conversion. 9'

methods here and the federalism issues thereby raised continue to be the subject of considerable
academic commentary the likes of which are not the object of this Article. Instead, confronting
certain consciously accepted and clearly recognized ramifications of that federal choice is the focus
here, as an aspect of the federal influence upon the development of the Self-Settled Paradigm. For
academic commentary spanning five decades on this exemption issue, for example, Marier, supra
note 45, at 666; Vukowich, supra note 96, at 790; Woodward, supra note 138, at 335; Brown, supra
note 98, at 163-70; Cole, supra note 98, at 227.
188. See generally 1997 FINAL REPORT, supra note 43.
189. See id. at 121-25.
190. Concerning that analogy, see supra Part II.C.2. For criticism of the growing affinity for
self-settled trust protection, see, for example, Sterk, supra note 8, at 1041, and Henry J. Lischer,
Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Pallbearers to Liability?, 35 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 479,
534-36 (Fall 2000). See also Randall J. Gingiss, Putting a Stop to "Asset Protection" Trusts, 51
BAYLOR L. REV. 987 (1999).
191. 1997 FINAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 122-23. With regard to similar concerns voiced in
connection with regard to self-settled asset protection trusts, see Lischer, supra note 190, at ("If the
APT were to be respected ... it would permit the wealthy to avoid their debts ... in a way that
those of less wealth could not ... [and would thus] degrade the public perception of the duty to pay
one's debts."); Sterk, supra note 8, at 1086-87 (discussing forum shopping in the context of offshore
asset protection trusts); GRAY, RESTRAINTS, supra note 1, § 262 (condemning spendthrift trusts
generally as promoting "a privileged class" and "the most contemptible aristocracy").
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Yet only recently have such objections moved Congress with
respect to bankruptcy exemption laws.'92 For example, the homestead
exemption planning opportunity appears to have finally garnered a
limited congressional response, although many potential abuses
remain.193 Specifically, under federal bankruptcy legislation recently94
passed by both houses of Congress, ("Bankruptcy Amendments")
forum shopping by means of relocating to a state with more generous
exemption laws must be undertaken well in advance of filing the
bankruptcy petition if the laws of the new domiciliary state are to govern
exemption issues.'95 The Senate's call for a more generally applicable
and nationally uniform dollar cap on the homestead exemption was not

192. See, e.g., infra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
193. The planning opportunity is significant, as shown by the substantial variation in values
permitted to be sheltered in different states, as discussed supra note 180. For a critical examination
of asset conversion opportunities, including this homestead exemption planning opportunity, see
generally Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert Their Assets on the
Eve of Bankruptcy: Villains or Victims of the Fresh Start?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 235 (1995).
194. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 333, 107th
Cong. (Mar. 1, 2001) (The House of Representatives passed this Act by a vote of 306 to 108). A
modified version of the House Bill passed the Senate by a vote of 82 to 16, and was denominated
simply the "Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001." H.R. 333, 107th Cong. (July 17, 2001) (as amended
by S. Amend. 974 and S. Amend. 977). The events of September I1, 2001, resulted in a
postponement of a formal meeting of a joint House-Senate conference, originally scheduled for that
day to reconcile the status of the bills. Reni Gertner, Bankruptcy, HMO Reforms are Stalled After
Terrorists Attacks, LAW. WKLY USA, Oct. 15, 2001, at I. The conference meeting did ultimately
occur in the Spring of 2002. Despite compromise on all other significant outstanding issues,
including those aspects specifically at issue in this Article, the bill now appears to be stalled by a
single ideological battle over the protection to be afforded certain abortion protestors. See Letter
from Dick Armey, U.S. Congressman, to Thomas Daschle, U.S. Senator (May 12, 2002), available
at http://www.freedom.gov/library/economics/bankletter.asp (last visited Oct. 1, 2002); Conference
Committee Reaches Agreement on Bankruptcy Reform, LAW. WKLY USA, May 13, 2002, at 12.
Virtually identical legislation was twice vetoed by President Clinton, but now enjoys the support of
President Bush, who has indicated he will sign the legislation if presented to him. Sheila Creaton,
Pro-CreditorBankruptcy Reform Moves Quickly Through Congress, LAW. WKLY USA, Feb. 19,
2001, at 1.
195. Under current law (i.e., without regard to the Bankruptcy Amendments), a debtor
relocating to a state with a more generous homestead exemption would get the benefit of that state's
law if the debtor resided in that state for ninety-one of the 180 days prior to filing-in other words,
forum shopping could result in significant advantages if the debtor relocated ninety-one days in
advance of filing. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (2000). Under the Bankruptcy Amendments as passed
by both the House and Senate, a change in domicile would need to occur a full two years prior to
filing if the exemption laws of the new domicile are to govern. See H.R. 333 § 307 (House version);
H.R. 333 § 307 (Senate version). Through the reconciliation process this period has been extended
to forty months with respect to homestead property in excess of $125,000 in value. See Congress
Reaches Homestead Compromise, II CONSUMER BANKR. NEWS No. 17, May 16, 2002, LEXIS,
News Library, News Group File, [hereinafter Homestead Compromise]; Conference Committee
Reaches Agreement on Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 194.
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Accordingly, while the new provisions appear to
limit the utility of some of the more egregious "eve-of-bankruptcy" asset
conversions by checking the temporal aspects thereof, the opportunity
remains for a debtor not in immediate bankruptcy peril to avail herself of
an unlimited homestead exemption by changing domiciles sufficiently in
advance of filing.9 7 It thus appears that little will change in the realm of
perceptions engendered by a federal bankruptcy system that continues to
reward the forum shopping efforts of well-advised debtors.' 8
embraced, however.

5. Equating the Planning Opportunities
Notwithstanding the noted but limited statutory modifications of
homestead exemption planning through change of domicile, the multiforum exemption framework has prevailed for over one hundred years
despite intense scrutiny and revisitation over the last three decades.' 99 A
strong argument can be made that the perceptions attendant the prospect
of such forum shopping, as permitted to continue under the 1978 Code's
exemption framework, have exerted a discernable measure of influence
upon the growing prevalence of asset protection over the last few
196. The Senate had proposed a firm $125,000 cap on the amount of homestead property to be
exempted for any debtor, regardless of the length of the debtor's residency in a particular state. See
H.R. 333 (Senate version). The House version of the legislation contemplated a $100,000 exemption
cap with respect to homestead property acquired within two years of the filing of the bankruptcy
petition, with a seven year "look back" provision where fraud or abuse was deemed to have
occurred. See H.R. 333 § 308 (House version) (instituting "look back" provision); H.R. 333 § 322
(House version) (instituting $100,000 cap); see also Enron's Texas Home Puts New Fuel in Case to
Limit Homestead Exemption, 14 BANKR. L REP. (BNA) No. 10, at S6 (March 7, 2002) (discussing
House-Senate disagreement on this issue and the competing proposals); House GOP Courts Senate
Democrats with Bankruptcy Legislation Compromise, 13 BANKR. L. REP. (BNA) No. 9, at 225-26
(Feb. 28, 2002) (same). Through compromise agreement, the 1978 Code would provide that the
homestead exemption remains unlimited where state law permits, except in the case of a debtor
convicted of a felony or certain types of fraud, in which event the $125,000 cap will apply
notwithstanding state law. See Homestead Compromise, supra note 195. That cap will also apply
during the first forty months that a debtor resides in a state that permits homestead property to be
exempted in an amount in excess of $125,000. See id.; see also Conference Committee Reaches
Agreement on Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 194. Subject only to narrow exceptions, then, the
Bankruptcy Amendments and the resulting House-Senate compromise fail to include a generally
applicable federal cap on the amount of homestead value that can be exempted when the residence
requirement has been met, thus leaving intact the unlimited homestead exemptions available to
debtors residing (for a sufficient time in advance of filing) in Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Texas, South
Dakota or the District of Columbia.
197. Actually, the Bankruptcy Amendments pose new forum shopping problems (or
opportunities) for the well-advised, as outlined in the Professors' Letter, supra note 180.
198. See, e.g., Professors' Letter, supra note 180 ("[T]he compromise compounds the
unfairness of the homestead exemption .... [T]he wealthy and the well-counseled continue to find
complete shelter from their creditors in a few states .... [l]t almost certainly will lead to new
headlines and new scandal .....
199. See, e.g., id.
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decades. 00 The only practical difference between homestead exemption
and trust asset protection planning is that forum shopping in the
exemption context requires a change of domicile, whereas forum
shopping in the asset protection trust context requires, in the first
instance, only that a trust's situs be carefully selected. 0 ' Indeed, the
limited nature of the congressional response to homestead exemption
planning-in light of the significant commentary long accompanying
consideration of that issue202-provides a potent frame of reference for
those who argue that there is absolutely nothing objectionable about a
solvent individual setting aside a "nest egg" in a self-settled assetprotection trust where no creditors are looming on the horizon.0 3 A
belief that individuals concerned about liability exposure would equate
the two planning opportunities is anything but tenuous.
Metaphorically, one could say that the bankruptcy exemption
planning "fertilization" of the asset protection trust landscape is rooted
in the association between the two areas and the apparent congressional
unwillingness to supplant federalism deference by embracing a uniform
exemption scheme that would ameliorate the benefits of debtor forum
shopping.2' 4 Indeed, the proper boundaries of acceptable asset protection
200. With respect to the perceptions engendered by the 1978 Code's exemption framework, see
Brown, supra note 98, at 194 ("From a policy view ... a system that allows such disparate
treatment of exemption planning that both debtors and creditors may have an expectation that
bankruptcy laws permit abuse is destructive."); Ponoroff, supra note 173, at 235 & n.70 ("[Tlhe
more high-profile and notorious cases [of exemption planning.] ... even if not outright abusive...
do present problems in that they create the impression in the public mind that the whole system is
tilted and unfair."); Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Bankruptcy: The Meaning of the "Fresh
Start," 45 HAST. L.J. 175, 245 n.236 (1994) ("There does in fact appear to be a popular perception
that bankruptcy is frequently abused by the well-to-do.").
201. With regard to trust situs, see supra note 114. Actually, a change of settlor domicile could
still prove beneficial in the trust context. Specifically, the most certain asset protection obtainable
domestically through a self-settled spendthrift trust would be that available to a settlor establishing
her domicile in one of the states that expressly recognizes self-settled spendthrift trusts as effective
against the claims of the settlor's creditors. In such a case, the conflict of laws issues would be
minimized, thus similarly minimizing the policy bases for setting aside the trust in a bankruptcy
proceeding. Regarding conflict of law and policy issues, see supra note 142.
202. See supra notes 173-93 and accompanying text.
203. See, e.g., Roundtable Discussion, supra note 122, at 807-08 (reflecting views of noted
asset protection attorney concerning the nest-egging concept, and the standard advice that
"something has to be left on the table").
204. On the federalism issue, compare the positions of Senators Hatch and Kohl in debating the
Bankruptcy Amendments. 147 CONG. REC. S2329 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) ("States have the right to set the homestead cap rather than the Federal Governement."); 147
CONG. REC. S2329-30 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2001) (statement of Sen. Kohl) ("[Blankruptcy is a
Federal proceeding that occurs in Federal courts .... The argument that every State should be
allowed to set an unlimited exemption if they so wish is not logical because it is not a States' rights
issue."). For a more analytical, less ideologically biased perspective on the Bankruptcy
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planning in both the trust and bankruptcy contexts are generally defined
only as a matter of degree, with the obligation to repay one's debts
versus maximizing wealth preservation opportunities available under the
prevailing legal framework yielding moral judgments that are
ambiguous, at best, with respect to less egregious conduct.0 5 Ergo, to the
extent the bankruptcy framework results in disparate treatment for
similarly situated debtors, the perception is created that there is
considerable asset protection advantage to be had by those willing to
pursue it-and that doing so is not only acceptable, but wise. The
fostering of such perceptions is not confined to the federal bankruptcy
framework, however. These perceptions have also been enhanced by
federal activities in the tax policy arena, as considered next.
C. A Taxing Perspective
Both logic and the period perspective adopted here suggest that a
tax policy view of the offshore asset protection trust movement be
considered in the context of the 1970s-forward period emphasized above
with respect to federal bankruptcy policies. As to logic, it was in the
mid-1970s that the movement of funds "offshore"-used here to mean
out of the U.S. financial system, at least directly, and into the financial
system of a foreign jurisdiction-motivated congressional action
directed at the offshore trust financial vehicle, with subsequent actions
2 6
culminating in a substantial revisitation of the issue in the late 1990s. 0
An examination of certain federal endeavors undertaken during this
period illuminates the environment which helped foster the recent
domestic self-settled APT movement that has so significantly abrogated
whatever inhibitions may have previously constrained the development
of the Self-Settled Paradigm within the United States legal system.2 7 In
particular, Congress' almost exclusive attention to offshore trust tax
ramifications and motivations-both in 1976 and when those issues
again rose to the forefront almost twenty years later-played a subtle but
nonetheless important role in the development of the APT arena and the
Self-Settled Paradigm in particular. 2°' Explored next are the ramifications
Amendment's approach to the homestead exemption issue that clearly supports the uniform federal
exemption position, see generally the Professors' Letter, supra note 180.
205. See Hirsch, supra note 200, at 227 ("[M ]oral analysis of debtor behavior is today steeped
in ambiguity.").
206. See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S2329-30, supra note 204.
207. See discussion supra Part III.A.
208. This is not to say that the federal government is inattentive to the more pervasive aspects
of the global financial economy generally, but rather the suggestion is that with respect to the
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of that focus upon tax considerations to the exclusion of the developing
asset protection momentum.
1. Blunting the Offshore Tax Motive
Growing attentiveness to the offshore trust phenomenon culminated
in 1976 amendments to the Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C.") provisions
that address the taxation of offshore trusts, or more technically, "foreign
trusts" settled by "United States persons. ' 2 9 Prior to these amendments,
it was generally possible for a U.S. person to utilize an offshore trust
vehicle to manage assets and to accumulate income tax-free. 2
Specifically, a U.S. person could create and fund an offshore trust
having U.S.-person beneficiaries (which often included the settlor), and
if the trust were properly structured and administered, income generated
by the trust property and accumulated within the trust would not be
subject to taxation by the United States government. 2 ' An important

offshore trust vehicle specifically, the approach has been one focused upon tax avoidance and
revenue maintenance. As to the global financial environment and looking outside the more limited
context of offshore asset protection trusts, no less than three Congressional Committees, the Federal
Reserve, the GAO, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Treasury Department, and the U.S.
Attorney's Office have recently investigated issues relating to currency movement, money
laundering and the "regulatory nightmare" that has become private banking on a global scale. See
S.C. Gwynne, Just Hide Me the Money, TIME, Dec. 14, 1998, at 46.
209. In tax parlance, the type of offshore trusts discussed in this Article-namely, those created
by a U.S. citizen or resident but sitused in a non-U.S. jurisdiction and not directly subject to primary
supervision by any court in the United States-fall under the tax category of "foreign trust," a
technical term now defined by joint operation of I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30)(E) and (a)(31) to include any
trust which is not a "United States person." A trust is a U.S. person-and therefore not a foreign
trust--only if: "(i) a court within the United States is able to exercise primary supervision over the
administration of the trust, and (ii) one or more United States persons have the authority to control
all substantial decisions of the trust." I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30)(E) (1999). Prior to the 1996 statutory
amendment, the classification of a trust as foreign or domestic was less clear and generally turned
upon the balancing of certain factors. See Carlyn S. McCaffrey, Fencing in TaxTravelers-The New
Foreign Trust Rules, 31 U. MIAMI SCH. OF L. PHILIP E. HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1701.2
(Tina Hestrom Portundo ed., 1997) (discussing foreign trust status prior to 1996 legislative
changes). With respect to individual natural persons, "[tihe term 'United States person' means ... a
citizen or resident of the United States." I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30)(A). "United States person" became a
statutorily defined term effective in self-settled asset protection trusts in the Revenue Act of 1962,
Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 7, 76 Stat. 960, 988 (1962), and the trust aspect of that definition was
amended in the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755,
1904-08 (1996). The term "U.S. person" as used in this Article is intended to reference a person
falling within the I.R.C. definition of a "United States person" and generally refers to natural person
trust settlors or beneficiaries.
210. See Susan D. Harrington, Planning for U.S. Beneficiaries of Foreign Trusts Under Recent
Regs., EST. PLAN., June 2001, at 258.
211. See id. at 258-59 (explaining some of the particulars of how this outcome was achieved).
Generally, however, distribution of trust income to a U.S. person beneficiary in the year in which
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corollary to this offshore advantage was that the offshore jurisdictions
most often utilized as the situs of such trusts were "tax-haven"
jurisdictions that imposed little or no taxes of their own, elevating the
offshore trust to what was effectively a tax-free vehicle for holding and
accumulating wealth.2 2
Congress was thus concerned at the time of the 1976 foreign trust
legislation that U.S. persons were establishing such trusts in order to
accumulate income without tax liability, and that the ability to do so
created an undesirable tax-motivated impetus for the creation of offshore
213
wt
trusts. Confronted with such happenings, Congress in 1976 changed
the income tax rules concerning foreign trusts settled by U.S. persons to
provide that if such a trust had a U.S.-person beneficiary, the property
transferred to the trust would be treated as if it were still owned by the
U.S. settlor. 214 Therefore, in lieu of the tax-preferred offshore trust result
occasioned under prior law, the effect of the 1976 legislation was to
render such trusts subject to U.S. taxation under what are commonly
referred to as the "grantor trust" rules.2 15 The specific consequence was
that income earned and accumulated within the trust was made taxable

such income was earned by the trust would typically result in that income being taxed to the
beneficiary. See also I.R.C. §§ 652, 662 (2001).
212. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY'S GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
ADMINISTRATIONS REVENUE PROPOSALS, Mar. 20, 1996, LEXIS, FEDTAX Library, TNT File,
Doc. 96-8483, [hereinafter 1996 Treasury Explanation]. Moreover, this favorable tax regime was
often coupled with strict bank-secrecy laws which made it difficult for creditors, including the
Internal Revenue Service, to trace assets. See id.; see also Sterk, supra note 8, at 1048 ("Offshore
trusts ... remain popular with some American settlors, because financial institutions [there] ...
retain the ... tradition of bank secrecy.") (footnote omitted). But see Maurice Offit, The Truth
About Offshore Asset Protection Trusts, J. FIN. SERV. PROFS. 66, 66 (2000) (complaining by
offshore trust proponent that "the word 'offshore' has a negative connotation, and a significant
portion of the planning community mistakenly believes that offshore asset protection trusts are
devices to illegally hide assets in tax-haven jurisdictions").
213. See Elena Marty-Nelson, Taxing Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Icing on the Cake?, 15
VA. TAX REV. 399,411 (1996).
214, See I.R.C. § 679(a) (2001) originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1013(a), 90 Stat.
1520, 1614 (effective for taxable years ending in 1976 or later with respect to foreign trusts created
or funded after May 21, 1974). For a discussion of this I.R.C. provision and its operation, see 1996
Treasury Explanation, supra note 212, and Marty-Nelson, supra note 213, at 410-15. The
discussion of foreign trusts presented in this Article is limited to so-called "outbound trusts," which
are grantor trusts for U.S. tax purposes, meaning those foreign trusts created by U.S. persons,
having at least one U.S. person beneficiary, and which are treated as owned by a U.S. person under
the grantor trust rules discussed infra note 216. The tax consequences and legislative proposals
pertaining to trusts created by non-U.S. persons is less germane and generally beyond the scope of
this Article.
215. See Harrington, supra note 211, at 258.
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to the U.S. settlor and not the tax-haven sitused trust entity. 216 In essence,
for income tax purposes the offshore trust was ignored and the settlor
was taxed as if the settlor and the trust were one and the same taxpayer,
thus (allegedly) thwarting the opportunity for tax-free wealth
accumulation via the offshore trust vehicle.2 7
Notwithstanding the operational effect of the 1976 legislation, the
new tax rules generally did little to dissuade the establishment of foreign
trusts, and in particular the "offshore asset protection trust" or "OAPT"
as to which the settlor retained an interest as a beneficiary. 2 8 While this
failure is addressed below,"' it is sufficient to note here that from an
income tax perspective, the new rules at best "leveled the field" between
domestic and foreign trusts, but did not create any particular
disadvantage to going offshore.22 This is because the grantor trust rules
were and remain broad in scope so as to similarly capture many
domestic trusts in this settlor-taxed-as-owner scheme, thus placing such
domestic trusts on equivalent (but not preferred) income tax footing with
their foreign trust counterparts.22 ' Moreover, crafting a foreign or
216. The provisions of I.R.C. §§ 671-79, which result in the taxation of trust income to the
person funding the trust, are commonly known as the "grantor trust" rules, because a person treated
as owner of trust property and so taxed is referred to under the I.R.C. for income tax purposes as a
"grantor." I.R.C. § 671 (2001). In this Article, the funding individual is referred to as the trust
"settlor." A trust as to which income is taxed to the grantor/settlor is typically referred to as a
"defective" grantor trust, implying that such tax consequence is undesirable. This is because, prior
to the advent of the grantor trust rules now set forth in I.R.C. §§ 671-679, a trust could be used to
shift income from property to the beneficiaries of a trust and away from the grantor-thus, if a trust
were established and the income still taxed to the grantor, this assignment of income objective was
defeated and the trust was "defective." However, with the compression of the marginal tax rates for
trusts such that the highest marginal tax rate applies to all trust income over $7,500, this result
actually became desirable in many instances, leading to the advent of the "intentionally defective
grantor trust." Compare I.R.C. § l(e)(2) (providing that for the 2001 tax year, 39.6% tax rate applies
to nondefective grantor trust's taxable income over $7,500), with I.R.C. § l(c) (providing that for
the 2001 tax year, an unmarried individual's taxable income-which would include income earned
by a defective grantor trust as to which such individual was the deemed owner under §§ 671-79-is
taxed at between 15% and 36% up to $250,000, and only income in excess of $250,000 is subjected
to the higher 39.6% marginal tax rate). The apparent irony and tax planning advantages of the
"intentionally defective" grantor trust are common knowledge among tax practitioners. Additional
discussion of this concept in the context of the asset protection trust can be found in Marty-Nelson,
supra note 213, at 406-07.
217. See I.R.C. § 697(a) (2001).
218. See infra notes 229-49 and accompanying text.
219. See id.
220. See Marty-Nelson, supra note 213, at 414-15 ("[Tlhe equally harsh tax treatment home
and abroad for grantors of asset protection trusts renders moot any offshore deterrence effect of
section 679 of the Code, legislative intent notwithstanding.").
221. Compare I.R.C. §§ 671-77 (delineating powers over or interests in a trust that will result
in grantor trust status for any trust, including a domestic trust), with I.R.C. 679(a) ("A United States
person who directly or indirectly transfers property to a foreign trust ...shall be treated as the
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domestic APT that fits within the Self-Settled Paradigm essentially
guarantees grantor trust income tax treatment by virtue of the settlor's
beneficial interest in the trust.22" Therefore, while Congress may have at
least equated the tax consequences of going offshore versus establishing
a domestic trust, the federal initiative left intact other nontax advantages
that favored going offshore.223 Most notable among those advantages was
the availability offshore of self-settled trust asset protection that was
virtually unknown in U.S. jurisdictions prior to the 1997 Alaska
legislation.224 Ironically, those asset protection features of offshore
jurisdictional trust laws provided settlors a unique transfertax advantage
under U.S. law, as discussed next.
2. The Income-Transfer Tax Dichotomy
Perceived weaknesses in the tax effectiveness of the 1976
legislation led to a subsequent federal response to the foreign trust
movement that was once again tax-centric., Similar to that prior
legislative effort, the 1996 response focused upon altering the income
tax rubric governing such trusts. 226 The perceived weaknesses in the
earlier legislation that spurred this response are articulated succinctly in
a 1996 Treasury Department explanation:
U.S. tax rules applicable to foreign trusts have not been revised for
nearly two decades. New rules are needed to accommodate changes in
the use and incidence of foreign trusts and to limit the avoidance and
evasion of U.S. taxes ....

owner ...of ...such property ...[for any tax year during, which] there is a United States
beneficiary of any portion of such trust."). See NORMAN H. LANE & HOWARD M. ZARITSKY,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF ESTATES AND TRUSTS § 13.01 (3d ed. 2001); Marty-Nelson, supra
note 213, at 406-12.
222. See I.R.C. § 673 (effecting grantor trust status with respect to certain retained rights in
trust principal); Id. § 677 (same with respect to rights to trust income). Inclusion of the grantor's
spouse as a beneficiary, perhaps in lieu of the grantor in order to circumvent these rules, was
thwarted as a means to avoid application of the grantor trust rules by the expansion in 1986 of the
grantor trust rules to include an interest held by the grantor's spouse. See Tax Reform Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1013(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1615. See generally LANE & ZARITSKY, supra note
221, § 7.02 & n.8 (detailing development of the grantor trust rules beginning with the 1934 case of
Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940)).
223. See discussion supra Part III.A-B.
224. The domestic APT legislation is discussed in supra Part III.A.
225. See 1996 Treasury Explanation, supra note 212.
226. See id.
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U.S. grantors of foreign trusts often do not report the income earned by
foreign trusts and often do not comply with required information
reporting. These foreign trusts are frequently established in tax haven
jurisdictions with stringent secrecy rules. Attempts by the IRS to verify
income earned by foreign trusts are often met with silence or a
representation that foreign secrecy laws prevent the U.S. taxpayer from
obtaining required information. Existing penalties have not proven
adequate to encourage some U.S. taxpayers to comply with existing
rules.227

The referenced changes in the "use and incidence of foreign trusts"
were known to span beyond the income tax issues contemplated under
the grantor trust income tax rules and to encompass the more general
asset protection being pursued through the use of these offshore trusts.228
In fact, a few years before the foregoing Treasury Department
explanation, the asset protection attributes of the laws of one offshore
jurisdiction were, without critical analysis, confirmed in an IRS ruling as
making available to a trust settlor certain desirable U.S. transfer tax
consequences. 22' This OAPT transfer tax planning opportunity is perhaps
227. Id. (emphasis added).
228. See also infra note 247 and accompanying text.
229. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9332006 (Aug. 20, 1992). The IRS is a division of the Treasury
Department. See also Rev. Rul. 76-103, 1976-1 C.B. 293 (dealing with a self-settled discretionary
trust that was deemed ineffective under applicable state law to protect trust assets from the claims of
the settlor's creditors). As to the prior case law, see, for example, Estate of Paxton v. Comm'r, 86
T.C. 785, 808 (1986) (acknowledging and applying these principles); Estate of German v. United
States, 7 Cl. Ct. 641, 642 (1985) (same); Estate of Green v. Comm'r, 64 T.C. 1049, 1061-63 (1975)
(same); In re Estate of Uhl, 241 F.2d 867, 870 (7th Cir. 1957) (finding that state law did not clearly
establish the rights of creditors to reach trust property, and, thus, that inclusion of trust property in
the settlor's federal estate tax gross estate, by virtue of such creditors' alleged access to trust
property, was improper); Herzog v. Comm 'r, 116 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1941) (finding completed gift
where creditors' rights under applicable state law were "in doubt" due to a lack of applicable
precedent in the precise context of a self-settled trust). The accuracy and extent of the various
courts' and the IRS inquiries into the asset protection aspects of state trust law is another issue
entirely, and is explored in Eason, supra note 112, at 83-94 ("There is little indication in the IRS
rulings that any detailed consideration would be given to potential arguments that a hypothetical
creditor might assert in attempting to defeat the creditor protection purportedly offered under the
laws of the jurisdiction selected by the settlor or trustee to govern the trust."). For example, in
Herzog, the court noted the widely accepted Restatement principles in favor of creditor access to the
trust property, but went out of its way to find the Restatement rule unpersuasive as to the
hypothetical creditor's rights in the tax case at hand (where no actual creditor was claiming against
the trust and seeking to thwart the trust protections), citing the more real presence of remainder
beneficiaries under the trust as significant. 116 F.2d at 594. The court believed the Restatement rule
to be based in large part on decisions where the settlor beneficiary was the sole beneficiary, in
contrast to the circumstance before the court in which there were other beneficiaries of the trust. See
id. But see Estate of Uhl v. Comm'r, 25 T.C. 22, 25 (1955) (distinguishing Herzog based upon lack
of other trust beneficiaries in the case at hand), rev'd, 241 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957). For the
applicable Restatement rule, see I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156 (1959).
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best understood through consideration of the tax consequences of a selfsettled trust that is not effective in sheltering trust assets from the
settlor's creditors. Specifically, it has long been a tenet of federal
transfer taxation that property contributed to a trust will be deemed the
subject of an incomplete gift and taxed as part of the settlor's gross
estate at the settlor's death, if the settlor retained certain interests in, or
controls over, the transferred property. 3 With respect to a trust falling
within the Self-Settled Paradigm, the penalized retained interest or
control is deemed to exist where the settlor's creditors have access to the
trust property-in other words, negative transfer tax consequences
pertain if the self-settled trust is not recognized as an effective asset
protection device. The theoretical justification for taxing such trust
property to the settlor-beneficiary at her death is as follows: if the
settlor's creditors can reach the trust property during the settlor's
lifetime in order to satisfy the settlor's obligations, the settlor's original
gifts to the trust are incomplete and the trust property is regarded as
effectively "owned" by the settlor until death, because the settlor
retainedinteests•
the ability (1) to enjoy
the trust property and (2) to revoke the
•
233
interests of other beneficiaries. The settlor is deemed able to do this by
incurring but failing to pay debts, thereby relegating creditors to the
vulnerable trust property for satisfaction of their claims.3 Prior to the
1997 Alaska legislation, such vulnerability and the attendant negative
transfer tax consequences were inherent characteristics of a domestic
230. See generally Marty-Nelson, supra note 213.
231. I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) (2001) brings into the settlor's gross estate transferred property if the
settlor retains "the possession or enjoyment of, or right to the income from, the property." The
purpose behind I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) is to bring into a decedent's gross estate property transferred
during life but in a manner akin to a testamentary transfer by virtue of the interests which the
decedent retained in the property until the time of death. See Estate of Whitt v. Comm'r, 751 F.2d
1548, 1558 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1005 (1985). Also, under I.R.C. § 2038,
property will be included in the settlor's gross estate where the settlor has retained a power "to alter,
amend, revoke or terminate" any other person's beneficial enjoyment of the property. With respect
to gifts, Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (2002) provides: "As to any property, or part thereof or interest
therein, of which the donor has so parted with dominion and control as to leave in him no power to
change its disposition, whether for his own benefit or for the benefit of another, the gift is complete.
But if upon the transfer of property ... the donor reserves any power over its disposition, the gift
may be wholly ... or ... partially incomplete .... " For a detailed treatment of the estate tax issues
pertaining to domestic and offshore asset protection trusts, see Eason, supra note 112, at 73-100.
232. For a more thorough discussion of the unified estate and gift tax statutory structure and
the (un)desirability of incompleted gift status, see Estate of Paxton, 86 T.C. at 801-02 & n.8
(expressing concern over potential estate and gift tax "whipsaw" arguments that taxpayers
sometimes assert).
233. See, e.g., Estate of German, 7 Cl. Ct. at 642.
234. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 76-103, 1976-1 C.B. 293 (acknowledging and applying these
principles); Estate of German, 7 Cl. Ct. at 642 (same); Estate of Green, 64 T.C. at 1061-63 (same).
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self-settled trust, because neither spendthrift nor discretionary
distribution
provisions would be enforced against creditors of a settlorb •
235
beneficiary. In contrast, if a settlor were to create a self-settled trust as
to which protection from creditors were granted under the applicable
foreign jurisdiction's laws (notwithstanding the settlor's status as a
beneficiary of such trust), the gift would be deemed complete and the
trust property would not be included in the settlor's gross estate at
death.236 Consequently, the transfer tax advantage of going offshore was
clear.
The general unavailability of self-settled trust asset protection
domestically, effectively meant that offshore asset protection laws
237
presented a unique domestic transfer tax planning opportunity.
Moreover, the favorable IRS ruling on this very point was significant in
the spread of OAPTs and their marketing, as evidenced by the fact that
confirmation of similar transfer tax advantages for an Alaska APT was
among the first orders of business for proponents of that domestic APT
legislation. In light of the other foreign trust income tax efforts
undertaken by Congress in 1976"39 and again in 1996,240 it is quite ironic
that an OAPT could (until 1997) provide domestic transfer tax planning
advantages by virtue of its unique self-settled but creditor-protected
nature.24' That the Alaska self-settled spendthrift trust legislation
ultimately became the true "equalizer" between offshore and domestic
trusts is telling with respect to federally inspired movements reflected in
235. See, in this regard, supra note 11.
236. See supra notes 229-35 and accompanying text.
237. See Marty Nelson, supra note 213, at 415.
First, OAPTs [Offshore Asset Protection Trusts] allow for greater flexibility in
qualifying for treatment as an intentional grantor trust, an instrument that maximizes the
economic value of the transfer of assets to the trust. Second, the flexibility in casting a
transfer of assets to an OAPT as a "gift," quite apart from qualifying for intentional
grantor trust status, has tax-planning advantages in its own right.
Id.
238. The confirmation of such advantages with respect to the Alaska legislation came in Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 9837007 (June 10, 1998). Counsel for the party requesting the ruling was Jonathan G.
Blattmachr, one of the drafters of the Alaska legislation. See Daniel G. Shaftel, Newest
Developments in Alaska Law Encourage Use of Alaska Trusts, 26 EST. PLAN. 51, 57 n.46 (1999).
One commentator has stated that these transfer tax advantages were a significant factor in the
Alaska decision to adopt asset protection trust legislation, although in truth the transfer tax
advantages are simply one front upon which the domestic jurisdictions need to present themselves
as viable alternatives to the offshore trust vehicle if they are to be competitive. See Roundtable
Discussion, supra note 122, at 815.
239. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1013(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1615 (1976).
240. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-88, § 1901, 110 Stat. 1755
(1996).
241. See Marty-Nelson, supra note 213, at 401.
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state-level asset protection decisions. 242 This seeming lack of federal
concern with such potential ironies and outcomes is considered next.
3. One Dimensional Concern
There can be little question that the federal government had fixated
on the offshore trust movement as of the decision
in 1996 to
143
substantially revise the foreign trust income tax rules.. In light of the
confirmation of the foregoing transfer tax advantages tied to the asset
protective features of OAPTs, 24 there can also be little question that the
federal government had contemplated specifically the asset protection
facet of that movement. 24 5 Nevertheless, the federal reaction seemed to
focus on asset protection only to the extent it entailed protecting assets
from the reach of the IRS. 246 The larger impact upon other areas of
federal policy or interests received only casual mention outside the
income tax-evasion context:
According to the administration, the U.S. market for asset protection
trusts is "exploding," but is believed to be fueled less by a desire to
evade taxes than to protect assets from creditors. Once the assets are
overseas, however, taxpayers soon realize that income generated in the
overseas accounts-and protected by strict bank secrecy laws-can
accumulate without the IRS's knowledge and, therefore, is not
reported. 241
As the foregoing synopsis foreshadows,
the Clinton
Administration's proposals and the resulting legislative and regulatory
changes to address foreign trust issues were entirely income tax driven,
with no discernable attempt to otherwise even contemplate the more
general asset protection ramifications of the offshore trust movement.
242. See generally Eason, supra note 112 (detailing the domestic responses to proliferation
of OAPTs).
243. See id. at 51-52.
244. See supra notes 230-41 and accompanying text.
245. See Eason, supra note 112, at 51-52.
246. See id.
247. See Administration Proposes AntiAbuse Rules for Foreign Trusts, Expatriation, 66 TAX
NOTES 915 (Feb. 13, 1995); see also 1996 Treasury Explanation, supra note 212; Treasury
Explanation of Clinton's Proposals to "Curb Foreign Tax Avoidance", TNT, Feb. 7, 1995, LEXIS,
FEDTAX Library, TNT File, Doc. 95 TNT 25-42. In context, the "US market" refers to U.S.
persons establishing trusts under the laws of offshore jurisdictions. See also Ryan Donmoyer, Tax
Principles Must Be Applied to Wired Economy, Richardson Says, 72 TAX NOTES 1588 (Sept. 23,
1996) (noting IRS Commisioner's finding objectionable the idea that "asset protection" via a
foreign trust might include protection from an IRS enforcement action). For a more detailed
discussion of the federal government's activities in this area, and in particular the perspective of the
Internal Revenue Service, see Eason, supra note 112, at 51-53.
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Instead, the end result was legislative authorization for new income tax
regulations that ultimately focused upon information reporting for the
benefit of the IRS, the imposition of rather harsh penalties for
noncompliance, 248 and revision of certain grantor trust rules to address
perceived shortcomings of the then-existing income tax framework.2 49
Viewing the offshore trust movement from the vista of income tax
revenue and tax-neutrality was not itself misplaced, but the federal
government's singular perspective with respect to actions taken served
to shift and then to solidify the lure of the "legitimate" offshore trust
environment from one of tax advantage to one of asset protection.
Indeed, the chairman of a Bahamian financial services corporation
recently summarized the matter thusly: "we consider that, as a taxadvantaged vehicle, the offshore trust is now virtually useless and we no
longer advocate that it should be used for any tax purpose., 250 Yet
interest in the offshore trust has remained so strong that growth in the

248. See i.R.C. § 679(d) (2001) ("The [Treasury Department] shall prescribe such regulations
as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this section."). For an analysis of the
regulations so promulgated, see Carlyn S.McCaffrey, Taking the "Foreign" Out of Foreign Trusts,
34 U. MIAMI SCH. OF L. PHILIP E. HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN. T 700 (Tina Hestrom Portundo
ed., 2000); McCaffrey, supra note 210, 11700; Robert F. Hudson, Jr., Loch Ness Monster or
Komodo Dragons-Actualand Unexpected Results of the Foreign Trust Legislation of 1996/1997,
32 U. MIAMI SCH. OF L. PHILIP E. HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN. 9 1900 (Tina Hestrom
Portundo ed., 1998).
249. See I.R.C. § 679(a)(5) (closing a loophole with respect to trusts originally treated as
domestic but which convert to foreign trust status during the settlor-grantor's lifetime). Additional
changes followed in 1997. See I.R.C. § 684, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1131(b), 111 Stat. 788, 978
(1995). I.R.C. § 684 was added as part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and requires immediate
gain recognition on the transfer of property transferred to a foreign trust as to which the owner is not
a U.S. person under the grantor rules prescribed at I.R.C. §§ 671-679. However, this provision has
no impact on the typical offshore asset protection trust, as the settlor-beneficiary of any such trust
will be treated as the owner for purposes of the grantor trust rules. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 674(a),
677(a).
250. David L. Lupi-Sher, The IRS's Fight Against Abusive Offshore Trusts, 88 TAx NOTES
162, 165 (July 10, 2000); see also Sterk, supra note 8, at 1048 ("Starting in the mid-1980s ...
several offshore jurisdictions identified a new source of trust business: clients seeking to avoid not
taxing authorities, but creditors."). The "legitimate" offshore trust environment should be contrasted
with the "abusive" offshore trust environment, pursuant to which unscrupulous promoters and
settlors alike tout offshore trusts as a means to evade (as distinguished from legitimately minimize)
U.S. tax liabilities. "Abusive trust arrangements typically are promoted by the promise of tax
benefits with no meaningful change in the taxpayer's control over or benefit from the taxpayer's
income or assets." I.R.S. Notice 97-24, 1997-1 C.B. 409 (warning also that "[tiaxpayers should be
aware that abusive trust arrangements will not produce the tax benefits advertised ... and that the
Internal Revenue Service is actively examining these types of trust arrangements"); see also Senate
Finance Committee Hearing on Tax Scams, relevant links available at LEXIS, Tax Analysts
Library, Tax Publications File, Doc. 2001-9901.
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Bahamian financial services industry continues to outpace that for
tourism. 251
A focus upon the income tax-motivated federal treatment of
offshore trusts is revealing in its own right with respect to federal
influence upon the burgeoning APT market. The federal nonresponse to
the asset protection dynamic of which it was keenly aware is even more
telling when considered in light of concurrent movements in the forum
of federal bankruptcy legislation, as discussed above. 252 An important
factor in this shift towards asset protection is that while the income tax
advantages presented by the offshore trust were in large measure
checked by congressional and Treasury Department initiatives, the asset
protection promise of going offshore and its attendant transfer tax
advantages were essentially left untouched. Those advantages included
the potential transfer tax benefits noted above.253 Such benefits were
derived most assuredly by virtue of the asset protection features of
carefully selected offshore trust law, as to which even a cursory
examination of domestic trust law would have revealed no counterpart
prior to 1997.254 With the federal government providing competitive
equalization through its pursuit of income tax neutrality on the tax front,
in retrospect it seems almost inevitable that domestic state jurisdictions
would exact their own measure of competitive equalization via the
emerging dynamic of self-settled trust asset protection.255 Of course, such
hindsight is more easily grasped when formulated from the vista of
federal influence upon the paradigms, and the development of that
perspective has been a central theme of this Article. Having so
progressed in that regard, attention now turns more pointedly to the
insights and ramifications that flow from such a perspective.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE FEDERAL VIEW ACROSS THE PARADIGMS

Although John Chipman Gray and others of his ilk present a
historic and ongoing assault upon creditor-protected trust interests,
pragmatically the status of such interests under current law appears to be

251. See The Bahamas Boasts Banking Bonanza, LAW., Nov. 3, 1998, at 21 (noting growth in
Bahamian financial services sector and citing new 1990's Bahamian trust legislation as important
among the underlying causes).
252. See generally supra Part III.B.
253. See supra notes 229-35 and accompanying text.
254. See Friedman, supra note 5, at 572.
255. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (Michie 2000).
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the product of additional influences."' Among those influences is a
palpable, sometimes considerable federal undercurrent that has over time
and in varying degrees moved the dialogue and operative rules affecting
both the Traditional and Self-Settled Paradigms.2 7 The present status
quo, for example, reveals a Traditional Paradigm long blessed at the
federal level with the promise of deference under federal bankruptcy
laws to state decisions concerning the parameters and acceptability of
imposing restraints on the alienation of property conveyed in trust for
the benefit of a third-party. 5 Likewise, the fiscal concerns underlying
the federal treatment of the offshore trust industry, as well as the
gamesmanship available under federalism's opt-out bankruptcy
exemption scheme, have done little if not helped to inspire a burgeoning
asset protection environment.259 Consequently, it is not particularly
surprising that domestic jurisdictions would attempt to capitalize upon
this flow by fitting new self-settled asset protection trust wares within
the section 541(c)(2) exclusion rule-a rule originally conceived against
the backdrop of the Traditional Paradigm but hardly crafted so as to
foreclose more expansive application.26 °

256. Regarding the statements of John Chipman Gray and others, see supra notes 1, 17, and
46-54, and the accompanying text.
257. See generally Part I.C. For a specific discussion of federal undercurrents in the reals of the
Traditional and Self-Settled Paradigms, see Parts 11and II,respectively.
258. See Tabb, supra note 43, at 13-14.
259. Those fiscal concerns and the opt-out exemption scheme are the primary focus of Part III.
The consequently burgeoning asset protection environment is evidenced, for example, by Alaska's
codification of self-settled asset protection provisions and the effect Alaska legislation has had on
other states.
260. See supra note 142 and accompanying text regarding the applicability of the 1978 Code
§ 541(c)(2) to self-settled spendthrift trusts. Moreover, the applicability of the § 541(c)(2) exclusion
to tax-qualified retirement plan interests-which are most often governed by a spendthrift restraint
mandated under federal law-seems to have been little considered by Congress. Based upon that
lack of consideration, it is not surprising that a split arose among the Federal Circuit Courts of
Appeal when it came to applying that exclusion to spendthrifted ERISA pension trust interests. See,
e.g., Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78, 79 (3d Cir. 1991) ("[Tihe reported decisions are in disarray, as
to whether 'applicable nonbankruptcy law' in this context was intended by Congress to be limited to
state spendthrift trust law, or whether it embraces federal law as well."). That circuit split was
ultimately resolved by the Supreme Court's holding in Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992).
The specific question raised in that case concerned ERISA's spendthrift mandate as constituting
"applicable nonbankruptcy law," such that a retirement plan interest subject to the mandate would
be immune from creditor attachment under the 1978 Code § 541(c)(2). With regard to this statutory
language, see supra note 135 and accompanying text. The Court held that the § 541(c)(2) exclusion
embraced such arrangements as spendthrifted under federal law. See Patterson, 504 U.S. at 765. See
the discussion of ERISA and its attendant "Federal Retirement Paradigm" in note 103, supra.
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A.

Dynastic Privilege

Leaving such matters to the states has resulted in a framework with
few limits on the amount of wealth that can be sheltered under the rubric
of the Traditional Paradigm. 26' Although the prospect of curbing such
deference to state laws by limiting the spendthrift trust bankruptcy
exclusion to a needs-based standard was placed squarely on the
congressional agenda under the Senate's proposed version of 1978 Code
section 541(c)(2), by that time the entrenched nature of the Traditional
Paradigm and the federalism concerns thereby implicated, trumped both
the competing marshalling of assets/fresh start bankruptcy policies and
the philosophical underpinnings of federal wealth transfer taxation
espoused by some. 262 Indeed, Nichols v. Eaton263 helped spur the
acceptance of the traditional spendthrift trust as grounded not in respect
for any beneficiary-specific policy consideration deemed sufficient to
warrant a corresponding and measured degree of asset protection, but
rather in respect for a donor's freedom to dispose of her property
absolutely to a trustee, to be held for the benefit of whomever the donor
chose to confer such largess upon and with due regard to the donor's
decision to specifically withhold her generosity from such beneficiary's
creditors. 4
As to the philosophical arguments concerning federal wealth
transfer taxation, some have posited that the relatively small revenue
generated by such taxes implicates other underlying motivations for the
levy over the course of its existence. Cited in particular is the general
concept of a democratic and capitalistic aversion to both privileged
wealth and
perpetuation of accumulated capital through
• 266 the
generations. Yet, as recognized and condemned early-on by John
Chipman Gray, it is by virtue of the Traditional Paradigm that privileged
wealth coupled with asset protection is quite easily enjoyed (at least by

261. See supra Part n.B.
262. Regarding the Senate proposal, see Part IlI.B. . As to wealth transfer taxation, see infra
note 271 and accompanying text.
263. 91 U.S. 716 (1875).
264. See id. at 725, 727.
265. See Barbara A. Hauser, Death Duties and hnmortality: Why Civilization Needs
Inheritances, 34 REAL PROP. PROB., & TR. J. 363, 376-77, 384-87 (1999); Mark L. Ascher,
CurtailingInherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 86-99 (1990). However, it should also be noted
that this fiscal reality has been recently relied upon by some in calling for the repeal of the federal
wealth transfer taxes, on grounds that the revenue generated does not justify the alleged havoc
reeked upon the owners of family businesses and other industrious sorts.
266. See Hauser, supra note 265, at 376-77, 385-87.
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generations subsequent to the primary benefactor). 26' And it is this very
opportunity that is preserved in the face of creditor claims by virtue of
the unbounded section 541(c)(2) federal bankruptcy exclusion
mechanism.26 Such deference to state law decisions concerning the
efficacy of restraints on alienation is supported only upon federalism
principles, and fails to account for any overriding purpose or
consideration 269
of the protection's possible impact upon other areas of
federal policy.
It must also be recognized that the opportunity to shield assets in
trust is one not easily overlooked by those contemplating the fate of their
fortunes and offspring. In contrast to planning with a traditional
spendthrift trust, however, prudent planning and even the most
outspoken advocates of the Self-Settled Paradigm suggest that a
domestic or offshore APT is best suited for setting aside a "nest egg"
amount. 27° The perceived limitation here emanates from reasonably
tailored hesitancy among the federal bench to recognize the validity of
some of the more aggressive protective trust strategies designed to
benefit the settlor during life. 271 Interestingly, though, it is the self-settled
possibility that has from the outset been most vigorously decried, despite
this practical limitation and despite the oft-noted counter argument that,
at least with respect to the settlor's protected interest, the Self-Settled
Paradigm pertains to earned rather than gratuitously conferred wealth.272
Nevertheless, the dynastic trust opportunity available through both
paradigms squarely presents the potential for multi-generational
transfers of substantial creditor-protected wealth. The ramifications of
267. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
268. See Hirsch, supra note 200, at 241-42.
269. For example, one specific area of federal policy concern that is implicated by the asset
protection trust debate is that pertaining to tax-qualified retirement plans. Such plans are often
equated with self-settled spendthrift trust arrangements, and for many such plans the inclusion of a
spendthrift restraint is mandated by federal law. See supra notes 103 and 260. With regard to the
relationship between more traditional spendthrift trust considerations and tax-qualified retirement
plans, see generally Patricia E. Dilley, Hidden in Plain View: The Pension Shield Against Creditors,
74 IND. L.J. 355, 385 (1999); Daniel Spitzer, Contra Goff. Of Retirement Trusts and Bankruptcy
Code § 541(c)(2), 32 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1266, 1294-1310 (1985).
270. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
271. See Estate of Paxton v. Comm'r, 86 T.C. 785 (1986) (refusing to recognize self-settled
trust for transfer tax purposes where settlor had transferred virtually all assets to the trust); In re
Brooks, 217 B.R. 98 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998) (refusing to recognize OAPT as excludable from
bankruptcy estate); In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same); F.T.C. v.
Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding settlors of OAPT in civil contempt
for failing to repatriate trust assets).
272. See GRISWOLD, supra note 37, § 557 (noting this point). This would be so with respect to
the settlor's interest, but not subsequent beneficiaries, if any.
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this are exacerbated by movements at the state level to repeal the Rule
Against Perpetuities as applied to trusts-an idea that seems coordinate
with asset protection in those domestic (and many offshore) jurisdictions
that have adopted the Self-Settled Paradigm via statutory enactment. 273
Couple this with the scheduled congressional repeal of federal wealth
transfer taxes,274 and it would seem that the privilege of accumulating
wealth to be enjoyed currently and then passed-on to subsequent
generations without depletion by the claims of outsiders has never been
more vibrant than today, and that federal policy either encourages or
passively favors such a state of affairs.275
B. A More ConsideredFederalPerspective
This broader view of trust asset protection and its underlying
federal influence suggests that a more considered federal approach to the
issue is warranted. At the very least, such analysis calls into question the
seeming federal disregard of purpose and wealth-based equity
considerations that are deemed so relevant in the crafting of many tax
and bankruptcy policies, yet cast aside for little apparent reason (apart
from federalism concerns) in the context of wealth preservation through
trust asset protection. In this regard, an appreciation of the significant
role federal policies and pronouncements have played in the evolution of
the Traditional and Self-Settled Paradigms ought to foreclose a unilateral
grant of unbounded asset protection fostered through federal
mechanisms like section 541(c)(2), absent the advancement of some
meritorious purpose that goes beyond blind deference to historical
federalism principles and the questionable property rights rationale
thereby supported.277 So long as this state of affairs endures through a
lack of federal attention to such matters, asset protection as an end unto
itself will continue to dominate progressions across the paradigms, such

273. See Shaftel, supra note 238, at 52 (noting Alaska has joined Arizona, Delaware, Idaho,
Illinois, Maryland, South Dakota, and Wisconsin as states which have abolished the Rule Against
Perpetuities); See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.050 (Michie 2000) (abolishing the Rule Against
Perpetuities).
274. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, § 61 l(d)(1)(B), 26
U.S.C. § 402(g)(B); I.R.C. §§ 51 l(a)-(c), 521(a) (2001).
275. See Sterk, supra note 8, at 1114; Gingiss, supra note 190, at 1005.
276. See Gingiss, supra note 190, at 1005.
277. See the discussion of the freedom of disposition argument as supporting recognition of
spendthrift restraints, as posited by Justice Miller in Nichols v. Eaton and discussed supra
Part II.C. I.
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as the evolution-or some might say devolution-that has brought home
the domestic self-settled APT.78
More directly concerning this Self-Settled Paradigm, many have
criticized both the domestic and offshore APT opportunities as
fundamentally undermining federal bankruptcy policy by permitting a
prospective debtor to essentially "endow" herself without regard to any
fresh-start or other socially conscious concerns. 279 This is achieved by
stashing assets in a trust of which the debtor is a beneficiary, and which
will allegedly thereafter be immune from creditor claims by virtue of
jurisdictional APT legislation and the bankruptcy exclusion under
section 541(c)(2). 8° Although creditors have plausible arguments to
assert in contravention of the alleged effectiveness of these APTs,"' the
likelihood that such arrangements will be successful at least as to some
debtors has independently led many to conclude that congressional
action is necessary to thwart this end-run around the debtor-creditor
framework of federal bankruptcy laws.28 These calls for federal action in
the context of the Self-Settled Paradigm further implicate a
reconsideration of the basic federal mechanisms that
have affected the
23
movements in trust asset protection more generally.
Further, a call to curtail the forces underlying congressional
deference to state law on matters like the 1978 Code section 541(c)(2)
spendthrift trust exclusion and the section 522(b) exemption opt-out is
far from heresy. Indeed, the call actually finds growing support of late as
the perspectives engendered by some of the more egregious asset
protection scenarios garner an increasing amount of negative attention.284
278. Seesupra Part I.B.
279. See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 8, at 1043; Lischer, supra note 190, at 534-36.
280. See supra Part 11I.
281. For an analysis of arguments that potentially undermine the effectiveness of a domestic
APT, see, for example, Boxx, supra note 5, at 1208-40; Sterk, supra note 8, at 1074-1104; Eason,
supra note 112, at 63-72.
282. As to calls for congressional action and even criminal sanctions in the arena of self-settled
asset protection trusts, see Sterk, supra note 8, at 1114-17 (concluding that criminal sanctions may
be the only viable deterrent) and Gingiss, supra note 190, at 1005-08 (proposing legislative
solutions to address the rise of OAPTs).
283. See Gingiss, supra note 190, at 1005-08; see also supra Part IV.B.
284. See, e.g., Ponoroff, supra note 173, at 239 (noting in context of arguing for replacement of
the opt-out bankruptcy exemption scheme with a system of uniform federal exemptions that "there
is little to say about the states' rights argument ... other than to note that it is an increasingly
unimportant one in the current environment"); 1997 FINAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 124 (noting
that discrepancies in treatment of debtors across state lines threatens to undermine integrity of
federal bankruptcy system); Professors' Letter, supra note 180 (noting the potential for negative
press resulting from continued and new asset protection forum shopping opportunities under the
Bankruptcy Amendments). But see supra note 204 regarding the continued assertion of ideological
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In fact, Congress appears to have at least acknowledged the deleterious
effect of unbridled deference to state law in the Bankruptcy
Amendments' limited curtailment of homestead asset protection
planning. Such action and its supporting rationale-as presented in the
1973 and 1997 Bankruptcy Commission Reports 28-lend credence to
the argument that federalism in and of itself is little justification for a
regime that clearly permits circumvention of larger federal objectives.
To those arguing that the Traditional or Self-Settled Paradigms do in fact
serve such a purpose by sheltering assets for those (potentially) in need
and thus keeping debtors off the public tab to the detriment of the public
fisc, the protections otherwise afforded under bankruptcy fresh start
principles serve as a partial rejoinder.286 More importantly, however,
such arguments are undermined from the outset by the general
disassociation of any beneficiary-specific infirmity or need in what is
likely the bulk of settlor decisions to establish a trust falling within
either the Traditional or Self-Settled Paradigms.287 It was exactly this
disassociation that was decried in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's
1875

pronouncements

disassociation continues

in

Nichols v.

Eaton,28 ' and that

general

today.289

C. The Means to Federally-ConceivedEnds
Short of abolition of the current trust protections, a course more
consistent with a purposive asset protection trust framework would be to
impose a dollar cap upon the protection afforded under the Traditional
and Self-Settled Paradigms by means of federal bankruptcy principles.
For example, rather than leaving the door open to asset protection forum
notions of state's rights in this context. Moreover, two early iterations of federal bankruptcy
legislation included a uniform federal exemption scheme that trumped state law exemptions

entirely. See supra note 45.
285.

See supra notes 148-51 and 191 and accompanying text for an analysis of the 1973 and

1997 Bankruptcy Commission Reports.
286. Indeed, those fresh start protections as furthered in the bankruptcy context are in no way
inherently tied to state law, and could easily (and perhaps more effectively) be addressed through a

uniform set of debtor exemptions in bankruptcy. Moreover, the § 541(c)(2) spendthrift trust
exclusion has never been theoretically supportable as grounded in any conception of the fresh start

rationale underlying exemption policy, although as a practical matter the association between the
effect of exemptions and spendthrift trusts upon creditors has been drawn. For a discussion of that
association and the disconnect in policies underlying the recognition of exemptions versus
spendthrift trusts, see supra Part H.C.2.
287. See Part II.C.1 regarding the divergence of spendthrift trust justification grounded in
special beneficiary needs versus the donor's freedom of disposition.
288. 91 U.S. 716 (1875); see also Emanuel, supra note 39, at 179 n. I.
289. See supra text accompanying note 82.
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shopping through deference to state laws on such matters, a dollar cap
could be placed directly within the confines of the section 541(c)(2)
spendthrift trust exclusion.29 ° Protection for traditional and self-settled
spendthrift trust arrangements could perhaps be even further limited to
the more purposive situations where a particular beneficiary infirmity is
shown. 9' To the extent federalism concerns continue to push in the other
direction, respect for a donor's freedom to craft protective trust interests
can always be retained for those interests that are grounded in a trust
forfeiture provision, thus eviscerating the more troublesome idea of
retained beneficiary enjoyment garnered through traditional spendthrift
protection. 292 Limitations upon creditor-protected dynastic trust
accumulations could also be imposed by restricting the section 541 (c)(2)
federal bankruptcy exclusion to interests derived under trust instruments
in effect not more than some stated period of time, such as ninety
years, 293 after which period the nonforfeited trust interest or underlying
assets could be subjected to the exigencies of modem life-i.e., creditor
claims. 294 In short, freedom to accumulate and to dispose fall short of
compelling justifications for bestowing federally sanctioned but
unlimited asset protection upon the particular traditional or self-settled
spendthrift trust vehicle through which such activities are pursued, and
290. This would be consistent, for example, with the treatment accorded IRA accounts under
the Bankruptcy Amendments. Under that legislation, IRAs are subject to an inflation-adjusted
$1,000,000 cap on the aggregate account balance to be shielded from creditors. Bankruptcy
Amendments § 224(e), amended 1978 Code § 522(n). The cited provision specifies that the
$1,000,000 amount "may be increased if the interests of justice so require."
291. See supra notes 79-83, 148-64 and accompanying text; see also Costigan, supra note 15,
at 492 (suggesting spendthrift protection should be limited based upon consideration of an actual
need for such protection). For practical reasons, this author prefers the dollar cap limitation set by
reference to some general conception of needs-based parameters, in lieu of a case-by-case, debtorspecific reasonable needs inquiry. From a practical standpoint, exemptions tied to specific debtor
needs inquiries were criticized in the congressionally commissioned 1997 Final Report as being too
dependent "upon subjective judicial determinations of what would be 'reasonably necessary' for
that debtor." The Commission further noted that "ItIhis fact-based test can lead to excessive
litigation or intrusive and time-consuming inquiries." 1997 FINAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 13940; see also Ponoroff, supra note 173, at 224-25 (criticizing case-by-case approach to the proper
bounds of exemption planning as leading to inconsistency, ambiguity and frustration among both
courts and debtors).
292. As to forfeiture provisions compared to direct restraints on alienation, see supra Part ILA,
as well as the text accompanying notes 48-54.
293. This ninety-year period represents one of the benchmarks adopted under the Uniform
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities. See generally Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory
Rule Against Perpetuities: The Rationale of the 90-Year Waiting Period, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 157
(1988).
294. See Ronald C. Link & Kimberly A. Licata, Perpetuities Reform in North Carolina: The
Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, Nondonative Transfers, and Honorary Trusts, 74 N.C.
L. REV. 1783, 1790-92 (1996).
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the absence of such limitations is by no means a necessary characteristic
of the existing framework.295
V.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this Article has been to explore the degree and
origins of federal influence across the creditor-protected trust landscape,
with an eye towards applying the perspective thereby gained. Rejecting
any effort to espouse "proof' that might rise to some level of federal
"causation"
of the Traditional or Self-Settled Paradigms,
pronouncements from the highest federal bench were revealed as having
been foundationally inspirational to acceptance of the directly restrained
trust interest that pervades the creditor-protected paradigms
conceptualized here. Further, the opt-out exemption framework
applicable in a federal bankruptcy proceeding was shown to both
encourage and endorse forum shopping to preserve assets, and when
viewed coordinately with the parallel focus upon only the income tax
ramifications of the offshore trust movement, the resulting structures can
be seen to have contributed to the legal and social environment that
helped inspire the Self-Settled Paradigm domestically. The continuation
of that environment as fostered through federal mechanisms, actions,
and perhaps passive acceptance, was then challenged as being neither
inevitable nor clearly defensible. The perspective thereby gained through
examining trust asset protection from the viewpoint of federal influence
dictates a need for more considered federal attention to the asset
protection currently offered under the Traditional and Self-Settled
Paradigms.

295. See GRISWOLD, supra note 37, § 552, at 631 ("[Tihe ... major premise [underlying this
spendthrift trust justification]-that the owner of property may dispose of it as he desires-is
patently fallacious.").
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